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FOREWORD
For a topic long overlooked by American policymakers
and strategists, the security and stability of Africa has
recently become an important national issue. This
nascent importance is readily seen in the increased time,
effort, and resources now devoted to the continent by
such new organizations as the U.S. Africa Command
(USAFRICOM). However, to be effective this growing
interest must be rooted in the desire to overcome centuries
of ignorance and misunderstanding about the conditions
and people of Africa.
This paper seeks to overcome this lack of
understanding of the significance of African security
and stability by discussing the fundamental issues of
economic development and political governance through
which enduring stability and security might be obtained.
This primer is particularly relevant for government and
military officials tasked with African responsibilities but
who may not possess much African experience.
This is not a typical Letort Paper advocating a position
or a policy. Although it does offer solutions in terms of
improving African stability and security, its main intent
is to offer a framework of several key issues which should
give policymakers the knowledge they need to work in a
constantly changing and very challenging environment.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish
this paper as a contribution toward a more complete
understanding of Africa and its security and economic
environments in order to improve the conditions of its
people.

		
		
		

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Economic activities are the most central of all human
endeavors. Although rich in human and geographic
diversity, Africa has fallen behind the rest of the world
in its economic development, adversely impacting
African aspirations. This paper explains why economic
development and good governance need to be the
basis of security and stability in Africa, and why both
should be a main focus for U. S. military engagement
on the continent.
Written as a primer for military and government
staff members who may be unfamiliar with Africa but
are assigned duties that involve participation in African
affairs, this paper explains the historic and modern
importance of Africa to American national interests.
It then lays a foundation as to how and why the U.S.
government, and especially the military, might become
involved in improving African economic development
and political governance in order to attain security and
stability. To better understand the circumstances in
Africa, this paper describes and analyzes its economic
and political conditions in terms of economic, social,
and demographic measures revealing why, as a
region, Africa lags the world in economic and human
development. The reasons for slow development are
examined through Africa's main economic activities,
which give insight to its current conditions and ways
to improve economic development and governance.
With these insights provided as background, the
paper then reviews current U.S. military engagement
with African nations and its effectiveness. It then argues
that military-led nation assistance and peace building
operations are not as good an option for improved
African development as the more appropriate approach

vii

of military-support to an interagency-led operation
under a better resourced U.S. Agency for International
Development, which would more effectively assist
Africa with achieving stability and security.
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SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFRICA:
A DEVELOPMENT APPROACH
WHY EXAMINE A DEVELOPMENT APPROACH
TO AFRICA?
For generations, Africa has been known as the Dark
Continent because of the general Western ignorance
of its geography, especially before the late 19th
century, and more recently of its people and culture.
This ignorance has led to centuries of degradation
through imperialism and decades of misinformed
policies. However, over the past several years there
has been a renewed interest by the U.S. Government
in Africans and their continent, as evidenced by
increased interaction in diplomacy, defense, and
development. Many recent programs meant to better
engage African states and their people attest to this
interest through billions of dollars spent on disease
reduction, promoting peace through enhancing African
peacekeeping abilities, and free trade opportunities
to encourage growth. Although Africa has grown
more important to Americans and their interests in
the past decade, in many ways the U.S. Government
and military officials are no better informed on Africa
than were their predecessors. In light of this newfound
interest in Africa, and new organizations like the U.S.
Africa Command (USAFRICOM), this paper strives
to educate those who are unfamiliar with Africa, but
tasked with participating in its affairs. This paper
starts with a brief overview of why Africa has grown
more important than ever before to Westerners—
especially Americans, both North and South—to
explain this increased interest, and to motivate those
wishing to understand more. This paper then lays the
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foundation for establishing much needed stability and
security in what has been an unsettled and violent
region by linking those desired conditions to economic
development and good governance. The defense and
diplomacy aspects of security and stability are relatively
well understood by most military and government
officials, but the economic development aspects are
not. For that reason, this survey explains the poor
economic and governance situation found in Africa
and examines the economic activity underpinnings
of it so as to enlighten new practitioners about what
has occurred and what changes are taking place. This
review then examines the military’s role in improving
conditions in Africa by discussing the current forms
of engagement and proposes more robust methods
of military involvement. When use of the military is
required, the U.S. military can best serve stability
interests in Africa by conducting traditional security
enforcement, newly relearned stability operations, and
expanded peace building roles under the firm direction
of a professional development agency. As interest in
Africa increases, USAFRICOM will play a growing
role, but one that must be properly defined to gain the
best effect.
Africa’s Importance and Problems.
The West’s long-term strategic interests in Africa are
clear: we must thwart the growth of terrorism and
transnational crime; we must prevent destabilizing mass
migrations; and we must maintain secure trade links. In
order to realize these strategic objectives, as well as to act
of out of simple human compassion to alleviate suffering
on a colossal scale, the world must fix the current
situation in Africa. From a more selfish perspective, a
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strong and vigorous Africa will open its markets to the
rest of the world and at the same time liberate an entire
continent’s energy, intelligence, and creativity.
— USAFRICOM Early Mission Statement1

The continent of Africa and its people have been
a central part of world events since antiquity when
northern Africa played a key role in Mediterranean and
Middle Eastern affairs. A long and close association
has grown between Arabs states and northern and
eastern Africa from ensuing centuries of commerce,
slave trading, migration, and Muslim proselytizing.
Europeans also share a long history with Africa,
starting in the modern era with the expeditions sent
by Portugal’s Prince Henry the Navigator in the 1460s.
From that time, Europe’s imperial ties have established
special relationships between those historic colonizers
and their former dependencies, which are apparent
today in many African languages, Christian beliefs,
and economic and political institutions. Conversely,
Africans have exerted economic and cultural influence
in Europe as a result of the significant numbers of
African immigrants living and working throughout the
European Union (EU). Even for the relatively young
Americas, Africa has played an important role since
the notorious 17th century triangular trade,2 which
established Africa as a major base of international
commerce and intercourse. The human connection
between the Americas and Africa, originating in the
forced migration of Africans as slaves, is of fundamental
interest to both North and South Americans since large
segments of their populations and culture descended
from Africans. Over 45 percent of Brazilians are at
least partially of African descent, and the share of pure
African descendents in countries like Haiti, Grenada,
and Jamaica exceeds 75 percent.3 African cultural
3

has had dramatic influence on the Americas, which
is evident in language, religion, food, and music (the
reputed origins of jazz, blues, and rock-and-roll). The
United States, with 12 percent of its population of
African origin, has also maintained a semi-colonial
connection with Africa through the reverse migration
of freed American slaves to establish the country of
Liberia in 1847, and the oscillating special relationship
that resulted. Thus there are long and deep cultural
ties between Africans and Europeans, Arabs, and
Americans—establishing the first of many African
influences throughout the world.
In the 21st century, Africa plays the same worldwide economic role that it has for the previous 4
centuries—providing natural resources from its
plentiful supplies, and markets for manufactured
goods. In earlier times foreign merchants traded for
gold, salt, ivory, and grain (in addition to human chattel). Today, Africa is a crucial source of energy,
strategic and ordinary minerals, and precious gems.
West Africa holds 60 billion barrels of oil reserves
and large natural gas deposits,4 which are expected to
comprise a quarter of U.S. petroleum imports by the
year 2015.5 Some analysts complain that this energy
dependency is so important that it dominates U.S.
policy in Africa at the expense of such other important
concerns as security and development.6 Likewise,
North Africa supplies a third of Europe’s oil and
natural gas, much via undersea pipelines.7 India, with
its rapidly growing economy, also desires to tap into
Africa’s oil and significant uranium reserves through
growing trade and diplomatic ties.8 China depends
on African oil for over 30 percent of its imports9 and
actively pursues fuel and mineral resources throughout
the continent with large infrastructure investments,
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supplying arms, and aid packages.10 African states
hold significant reserves of strategic minerals, with
South Africa a world leader in platinum (89 percent),
chromium (61 percent), vanadium (24 percent), and
gold (14 percent); Congo a leader in cobalt (49 percent)
and industrial diamonds (26 percent); and Botswana
in industrial diamonds (22 percent) and gemstones (23
percent).11 Africa has also been a traditional overseas
market destination for manufactured goods starting
with the triangular trade by importing refined metals,
cloth, guns, and ammunition. Such trade is indicative
of Africa’s chronic economic underdevelopment that
continues unabated. Today Africans buy some high
end goods from Europe and America, but most of its
needs are met by less expensive items from newly
industrializing countries. Trade between China and
Africa nearly tripled from $10.5 to $29.4 billion between
2000 and 2004,12 and trade with India is estimated at $25
billion.13 The bonanza of natural wealth and potentially
large markets for manufactured goods helps to explain
the renewed interest and competition in Africa by
the industrialized states, and why Africa’s relatively
underdeveloped situation is of increasing importance
in the global economy.
Africa’s strategic location also contributes to its
global importance. Since antiquity, northern Africa
has been part of the crossroads where three continents
meet with an incalculable legacy of intellectual and
economic activity. Africa was the barrier around which
Europeans probed for the riches of the East and its
importance remains, as it is flanked by major maritime
passages at Gibraltar, Suez, the Bab el-Mandab, Cape of
Good Hope, and the Gulf of Guinea. Its close proximity
also makes oil, natural gas, and other African resources
more attractive to European and American importers
than similar goods from the more distant Middle
5

East (as well as contributing to the diversification
and security of sources). During World War II, Africa
was used by the Allies as a staging ground for troops
bound for Italy and southern France and for ferrying
aircraft from Brazil through Liberia to the European
theater. In the subsequent years following WWII, the
political neutrality and newly independent status of
many African countries made the continent a battle
ground during the Cold War through proxy conflicts
and political competition for support. African countries
still remain politically important for the 54 votes they
cast in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly and
other international organizations and are wooed for
their influence as one-quarter of the world’s sovereign
states. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) gained
admission to the UN General Assembly in 1971 with a
large bloc of votes from African states. India hopes to
use similar leverage in its favor to become a permanent
member on the UN Security Council.14 Even the
Nordic countries, with no vital interests in Africa,
are very engaged in the region for the influence they
can win “gaining international prestige and building
reputations in order to achieve influence in a highly
institutionalized world.”15 Whether as an obstacle,
target, or transit area, Africa’s combination of strategic
central location and international role remains an
enduring part of its global importance.
The African continent’s location, spanning the
equator, has also given it a rich ecological diversity and
a key role in global climate and human health. Africa’s
stunning physical beauty and cultural richness, as well
as close proximity to Europe and strong historic and
cultural ties with Europeans, is the foundation of an
international tourism industry that is an economic
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mainstay to many African countries. Ecologically,
Africa’s bio-diversity is an important source for
economically valuable medicinal, food, fiber, and
industrial products. For example, 25 percent of cancer
medicines used in the United States originated from
one of 40 rain forest plants from around the world,
many of them from Africa, with 250 others known to
have anti-cancer characteristics, and tens of thousands
of other plants yet unexamined but threatened with
extinction.16 Protecting such assets should be an
international concern. Africa’s tropical forests also
act as a carbon sink that moderates the global climate,
but the forests are shrinking rapidly, for example
Cameroon currently has only 40 percent of its original
forest, the best condition of any African country. This
loss contributes to the buildup of green house gases,
soil degradation, and desertification.17 Another related
world-wide threat is emerging in Africa’s interior.
Over the past several decades, with the opening of
previously inaccessible parts of Africa, the world
has seen the sudden emergence of virulent diseases
such as Ebola and Marburg hemorrhagic fevers.
Slower developing Human Immunodeficiency Virus/
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS)
also originated in Africa18 and serves as a warning that
local diseases may have world-wide consequences.
Left alone, Africans would suffer greatly from their
diminishing ecological heritage and devastating
diseases, but so would the rest of the world through
pandemics, global climate change, and loss of economic
potential. For these reasons, it is easy to understand
why Africa is important at the international level for a
host of environmental, health, and well-being related
issues, and why strengthening international support
for Africa is necessary by the world of nations.
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For both charitable and self interests, the
more developed peoples of the world have often
demonstrated a humanitarian obligation to those
in Africa. This tradition dates back to Christian and
Muslim missionaries who wished to do good and
advance Africans in what was summarized as the
“white man’s burden” by Rudyard Kipling. Modern
Western interest for the plight of Africans might be
dated to the one million Ethiopians who starved
to death in 1984, launching an unprecedented
intervention campaign including the groundbreaking
Band Aid recordings and Live Aid concerts.19 Since
then, Africa has been rocked by a series of natural and
manmade disasters, including civil wars in Rwanda,
Sudan, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia, and
desertification in the Sahel to name just a few that have
garnered international attention and varying levels
of assistance. Such tragedies have created enormous
numbers of refugees, accounting for 7.5 of 9.2 million
world-wide in 2005, and unsettled situations20 that can
lead to intra-African tensions and foment hotbeds of
terrorism and other forms of violence. Africa’s rapidly
growing population of nearly one billion people face
other humanitarian problems like the contagious
diseases African typanosomiasis (sleeping sickness),
cholera, yellow fever, and river blindness that leave
its population vulnerable. Malaria alone kills one
million people annually in Sub-Saharan Africa.21
These epidemics have been addressed through
U.S. Government aid totalling $15 billion as part of
the United States Leadership against HIV/AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003, and renewed
again in 2008. Most of this aid, along with many other
programs from around the world, is destined for Africa
to counter the two million infected with AIDS every
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year amounting to an estimated 22 million already
afflicted.22 The cumulative suffering and lack of hope
have led some 70,000 Africans annually, many the
most highly educated, to migrate in search of a better
life,23 with 4.6 million settling in nearby Europe.24
Much of this is through illegal immigration, including
a dangerous trek by boat people, bringing many of the
same problems and consequences experienced along
the U.S. southern border.
Africa poses important security concerns for
the world because of its frequent internal conflict,
corruption, and weak political structures that have
made African states insecure and unstable. Starting in
1957, the transition of colonial regimes to indigenous
rule sometimes resulted in violence, but almost always
in fragile and parochial governing schemes. Weak,
inexperienced, and often self-serving governments,
caught in the height of Cold War rivalries, made
Africa an arena of international intrigue which rarely
benefitted most Africans. The fighting in Angola and
Mozambique are examples of prolonged suffering
from such internal and external conflicts. To win favor
and support for their causes, the Eastern and Western
blocs offered aid that was usually unaccountable and
misdirected, and thus reinforced a legacy of corruption
and futility.25 Africa’s natural riches proved to be
double-edged, as “likely to exacerbate a resource curse
and benefits [that] accrue to elites thereby undermining
development and democracy.”26 Sudan is an example
where a government is not accountable to its people
because its finances stem from oil sales, and its
support comes from foreign governments.27 Since their
independence, Sub-Saharan countries have endured
over 80 successful and 108 failed coups28 attempts
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accounting for 44 percent of the world’s total.29 The
worst example of violence is the Democratic Republic of
Congo’s intra- and interstate fighting, which since 1996
has claimed 5.4 million lives, making it the bloodiest
conflict since World War II.30 Recent violence in Kenya
and Zimbabwe shows that unrest can overturn decades
of economic improvement. Another consequence is
lack of confidence and investment of Africans in their
homelands with over $150 billion of their capital kept
off-shore and not supporting the economy in Africa.31
One U.S. Congressional Research Service Report on
Africa concludes: “Instability . . . heightens human
suffering and retards economic development, which
may threaten U.S. economic interests.”32 Its insecurity
and instability keep Africa a focus of international
geopolitics.
Another problem is that Africa’s ill-governed
spaces have also attracted terrorist groups by providing
access to transport systems, safe havens, and venues
for transnational terrorist funding.33 Africa has been
the location of several deadly terrorist acts committed
against Western interests such as the U.S. embassies
in Nairobi and Dar el Salaam in 1998, and against
Israeli interests in Kenya in 2002. Wars, lawlessness,
and corruption have also fostered international crime
on an immense scale. Africa acts as a way station for
illegal drugs from Latin America and Asia that are
destined for Europe. Africa is the center of an upsurge
in piracy in the Gulfs of Aden and Guinea, and Nigeria
is a notorious source of Internet-based crime. Not
surprisingly, India has concentrated its diplomatic
initiatives in east African countries “to fight terrorism
and ensure maritime security in the Indian Ocean
region, and to put a leash on the mafia groups that have
been using some of these countries as a safe haven.”34
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To confront such conflict and crime, military forces
from around the world have been involved in African
affairs from the UN’s first peace enforcement attempt
in Congo in 1960, to numerous French and British
interventions in their former dependencies. More
recent military participation includes: the ill-fated
U.S. mission in Somalia in 1994, and more successful
efforts such as the United Nations Mission in Liberia
(UNMIL), the international Combined Joint Task Force
Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), and the Kimberly Process
Scheme to prevent the sale of blood diamonds. The size
and interlocking nature of problems explains why the
U.S. National Security Strategy gives Africa renewed
importance and seeks stability and security in Africa
through improving governance and development by
leading the actions of like-minded countries.35
In a world of increasing globalization, Africa is of
rising importance to the international community for
the opportunities it presents and the threats it poses.
Africa’s strong cultural ties, its rich traditions, and
its essential economic trade have benefitted much of
the world. Africa’s location and its roles in climate
moderation, world transportation, and international
organizations are literally central to global interests.
Africans’ suffering from disease, underdevelopment,
and poverty burdens and hobbles Africans and
their participation in world activities. Finally, weak
political will and institutions that tolerate rampant
conflict, crime, and corruption threaten international
security and stability, as well as African prosperity.
These problems were increasingly addressed by the
administrations of Presidents William J. Clinton and
George W. Bush through greater action and intervention
in Africa.36 President Barak Obama’s first official visit
to Africa in 2009 purposefully underscored Africa’s
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interconnectedness with the world by making his visit
to Ghana part of his mission to a G-8 summit in Italy. He
explained, “Africa is not separate from world affairs,”
but is a fully integrated part of the global economy.37
As Africa has grown more important to both the United
States and the rest of the world, we need to better
understand its debilitating problems and their causes,
so that we might chart courses of action by which to
address them.
The Keys to Stability and Security.
Correspondingly, the overall posture and thinking of
the United States armed forces has shifted—away from
solely focusing on direct American military action, and
towards new capabilities to shape the security environment in ways that obviate the need for military intervention in the future.
— Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates38

Many causes have been suggested for the chronic
problems Africans face: social, geographic, imperialist,
ethnic, or religious, to name just a few. Because Africa’s
problems are complex and diverse nearly any suggested
cause may be contributory, but not necessarily
fundamental. For example, in less-nuanced discussions,
shorthand explanations sometimes attribute Africa’s
problems to cultural stereotypes with easy labels
that too often deal only with symptoms.39 However,
Africa’s cultural diversity may be a strength as well
as a weakness. Physical geographic characteristics
also offer both advantages and disadvantages as their
benefit depends upon how nature’s cards are played.
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Certainly some things, like Africa’s propensity for
disease, are detrimental—but Africa does not face any
problems graver than those already addressed by other
more successful developing regions of the world.40
While on his first trip to Africa, President Obama
directly addressed the reasons for Africa lagging
by declaring, “For many years we’ve made excuses
about corruption or poor governance, [insisting] this
was somehow the consequence of neocolonialism, or
the West has been oppressive, or racism . . . I’m not a
believer in excuses.”41 The problems that Africans face
come down to two fundamental challenges well within
Africans’ ability to control: establishing good political
governance and sustainable economic development—
both of which are part of the foundation of the stability
and security they need.42 Internal and regional
security and stability enable the formation of proper
governance and development, but good governance
and economic improvement also directly contribute to
stability and security. However, political governance
and economic development are the structures upon
which other problems will be solved. For policymakers,
especially military ones looking to assist Africa, the
security aspects are relatively well understood, but the
economic and political sides are less well known, and
need to be emphasized because they are crucial. For
that reason, this paper surveys economic and political
aspects of Africa’s condition and their ties to security
and stability, so as to better understand and achieve
U.S. national interests and Africa’s common goals.
Security and stability are recognized as precursors
to solving other problems in a country because they
form a needed solid foundation.43 The traditional
military view of state security is control of borders
and vital accesses and absence of unwanted foreign
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coercion in sovereign affairs. However, security and
stability also require internal rule of law, order, and
justice to form a safe, secure, and stable environment
in which to gain the local populace’s support.44 From
the 19th century Philippines to modern Afghanistan
U.S. military operations show that state security and
internal stability factors must be addressed to establish
the prerequisites for building viable nations.45 Simply
stated, instability, violence, and war are major
constraints to economic development anywhere in the
world, as is especially demonstrated in Sub-Saharan
Africa.46 In part, this is because secure and stable
conditions lay the foundation to sustain the good
governance and economic development that make
a state viable.47 The commander of the U.S. Army’s
Combined Arms Center (CAC) calls such actions in
places like Sub-Saharan Africa “preemptive stability
operations,” attaining security and stability before, and
not after, violence starts.48 The foundational need for
stability and security is equally recognized by Africans,
as when leaders of the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) realized that a “combination
of poverty and bad governance is no doubt a great
part of the causes of the conflicts in West Africa.
Accordingly, there can be no economic advancement
without a peaceful, stable and secure environment.”49
Liberia’s Minister of Information is more explicit in
that he supports the U.S. Government policy “that
development operations must in some way become
synergized with defense operations; the former cannot
occur without the latter.”50 These are basic principles
on which both Africans and those who wish to assist
them can agree.
Stability and security contribute to human and
economic development by establishing the conditions
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by which they can flourish, but security and stability
also depend upon them in a symbiotic way. The entire
premise behind the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) philosophy on economic growth
in post-conflict countries is that “the fundamentals
of economic growth increase the likelihood of
successfully preventing a return to conflict.”51 Internal
conflict may arise when modernization brings rising
expectations within a society that “are difficult to
assimilate in the unstable political systems which
characterize the developing world.”52 For instance,
lack of economic development undermines stability
through abject poverty when a population expects
that conditions should be better.53 This encourages
risk takers to use violence to change the situation or at
least gain their share of any meager wealth.54 Growing
expectations compound insecurity and instability
when population growth outstrips economic growth,
as happens in Africa. The Joint Operating Environment
gloomily forecasts that over the next 20 years, it will be
Africans who mainly constitute the bottom billion of
poverty world-wide, resulting in violence within and
between states.55 Likewise dashed expectations due
to political mal-governance undermine stability and
security. Nobel laureate Desmond Tutu believes that
in apartheid South Africa, “Stability and peace came
when the inalienable rights of all were recognized.”56
Political access and change are necessary to allow
the readjustment and balance often required to
avert violence in fragile states.57 Such codependence
among the essential conditions of stability, security,
development, and governance makes improving the
situation in Africa challenging. However, during
President Bush’s last trip through Africa in 2008, he
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specifically visited five countries to showcase their
progress58 and prove that advances are possible. With
proper international assistance in these areas, Africa’s
contributions to the world and to the continent’s own
well-being will improve.
For military forces to assist in improvement,
an understanding of their role is in order. The U.S.
military, especially the Army and Marine Corps, have
the ability to not only establish security and stability
on foreign soil, but to promote better governance and
economic development while doing so. Today, in Iraq
and Afghanistan U.S. forces are attempting similar
goals through stability operations, defined in Joint
Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, as:
…various military missions, tasks, and activities
conducted outside the United States in coordination
with other instruments of national power to maintain
or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide
essential government services, emergency infrastructure
reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.59

Because of its key role in achieving peace and political
objectives, the importance of stability operations has
been elevated by the Department of Defense (DoD)
to the same level and priority as combat operations.60
Likewise, French doctrine in FT-011 recognizes the
stabilization phase as “both decisive and fundamental
to the operation,” although addressing here only the
post-conflict nature of stabilization.61 Clearly military
forces are at times expected to establish lasting stability
and security beyond policing and peace operations.
Other countries have also found an important role
for military forces for assisting Africa beyond being
an intervening armed force. For example, “all Nordic
states have either formulated strategies on how to
coordinate efforts in order to address development
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and security simultaneously, or pointed to the need
for such strategies. Most such strategies include use
of military forces…. [As part of its work for UNMIL
in Liberia, Sweden] aims to create synergy between
development and military efforts . . . as a holistic effort
to address development and security simultaneously.”62 Dr. Thomas Barnett, an expert on global conflict
forecasting, believes that the U.S. military will intervene
more in “gap and seam states ” in places like Africa
to ensure world-wide stability and security, which
“requires the [U.S.] Army to engage not only military
and insurgent forces, but to concentrate on economic,
cultural, and sociopolitical structures and issues.”63
The U.S. military and others in the world are capable
of assisting in establishing security and stability, along
with economic and political advances to chaotic,
devastated, or impoverished places in the world.
Stability operations usually fall to military forces in
the aftermath of conflict because the humanitarian need
is immediate, and their skills and resources are readily
available. Although stability operations have often
been an unwanted and unintended mission, U.S. forces
nonetheless have achieved significant results during
such operations as in Mexico in 1847, the Philippines,
Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua,
Germany, and Japan. Such actions are crucial after
conflict, but do not have to wait until the aftermath
of fighting to be employed, as Nordic thinking on
the subject has indicated. Indeed, U.S. doctrine also
espouses the benefits of pre-conflict military support
towards stability and security. The Joint Operating
Environment recognizes that, “Preventing a war will
prove as important as winning a war,” and that a
full range of skills and missions are now needed by
military forces to achieve the stability and security that
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both war and peace operations demand.64 U.S. Army
doctrine, the leading edge of U.S. military thinking,
specifically states that stability operations may occur
before hostilities, and thus may prevent hostilities
and the need for armed intervention by addressing
the causes of potential conflict.65 The need for early
non-armed military intervention is not a new concept
for the U.S. military. During discussions on low
intensity warfare during the 1980s, the necessity for
early involvement well before the bullets fly was an
understood tenet, if not often acted upon.66 Today, the
U.S. military forces are conducting stability operations
not just in occupied Iraq and Afghanistan, but in East
and Central Africa as well. As part of CJTF-HOA’s
counterterrorism mission, its Director of Plans and
Policy noted, “Our mission is 95 percent at least civil
affairs . . . the main approach now focuses on defenserelated development of communities and societies.”67
When explaining on-going U.S. bilateral military
training and operations in the Saharan region, a U.S.
unified command staff officer observed, “This is phasezero (pre-conflict) warfare . . . so it [Africa] doesn’t turn
into an Afghan-like scenario.”68 Stability operations
are an important way for military forces to foster
stability and security through economic and political
development. These operations show the utility of
military forces in such actions and therefore the need
for military members to understand the underlying
economic and political problems in which military
organizations such as USAFRICOM may assist. This
is the type of thinking that underscores new military
capabilities that can shape the security environment as
referred to by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in the
quote that introduced this section.69

18

Other methods for attaining security and stability
are peace building, state building, and nation building.
These are successively more involved and ambitious
strategies that establish long-term stability in weak or
failed states. The definition of peace building is similar
in both U.S. and UN doctrine. The UN states “peace
building involves a range of measures targeted to
reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by
strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict
management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable
peace and development.”70 The objectives of both UN
peace building and U.S. stability operations are similar
as well, as offered in Field Manual (FM) 3-07: safe and
secure environment, established rule of law, social wellbeing, stable governance, and a sustainable economy.71
Despite the parallels between peace building and
stability operations, differences exist. In U.S. doctrine,
stability operations are a lead mission for the military,
while other parts of government, international
organizations, and nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) take more responsibility in peace, state, and
nation building. The focus and time horizon for both
differ also, with stability operations specifically using
near-term phrases like essential, emergency, and relief,
while UN peace building touts broader goals and
longer time frames as implied in the phrase “rebuild
governmental infrastructure and institutions.”72 If
stability operations are applied to their extreme, they
can become state or nation building operations.73 State
building and nation building do not have official U.S.
or UN definitions, so working concepts are used in this
paper. In state building, other countries intervene to
build or rebuild the structures of a weak or failed state
in order to make these institutions more secure and
stable for the long term.74 Nation building broadens
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the concept of state building through external actors
who promote long-term economic well-being, social
equity, and enhancing the citizenry’s allegiance to the
rebuilt state.75 Military forces may help in constructing
countries in need, as a lead or support organization,
through the noncombat security and stabilization roles
of stability operations and peace building. However,
the more complex and involved roles of state and
nation building are often avoided by armed forces,
which prefer that civilian organizations dedicated to
such long-term undertakings perform them.
A recognition by military commanders and staffs
that Africa is important, imperiled, and may benefit
from military involvement is part of the solution
for problems in Africa. In this section, examples of
military involvement were purposely left superficial
simply to establish that military forces may have a
significant role in Africa’s security and stability. The
analysis section of this paper deals with more specific
ways of how military forces might be used to improve
the situation in Africa. An understanding of African
problems and their potential solutions is often lacking
among military members, and training given to learn
this knowledge is usually inadequate. One observer
notes that in the military, “Too often the first question
is about what should be done rather than the nature
of the problem.”76 This violates the first step of conflict
diagnosis, which aims to outline the key context issues
of the operational environment, such as poverty.77 This
lack of crucial knowledge about development issues is
not unique to U.S. forces and has also been noted by the
UN as one defect hindering the use of military forces
in socio-economic recovery and development.78 To
educate members to broaden their horizons to include
a wider-than-military context as part of their solution,

20

the next sections explain Africa’s poor economic and
political situations in both absolute and relative terms.
This paper should serve as a primer on issues and
conditions for international participants in African
stability. A better understanding of the economic and
political situation and problems in Africa may build
long-range mutual benefits for all concerned. The
nature of the problems requires a holistic approach
for Africa, one in which those who wish to improve its
stability and security must understand its challenges.
DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY
Africa’s Human and Economic Development.
In 1957, after 136 years under colonial occupation,
Ghana’s independence marked the beginning of the
shift from colonial to majority rule in Africa. Ghana
was chosen as one of the first states because it was best
prepared for sovereignty, with a relatively efficient
civil service and education structure, abundant natural
resources, and a viable economy. That same year, by
contrast, the Republic of Korea (ROK) was rebuilding
a country devastated by 45 years of brutal Japanese
imperialism and a subsequent 3-year conflict that
killed hundreds of thousands of South Koreans. South
Korea then labored under a dictatorial regime, was
bereft of natural resources, and entirely dependent
upon international aid.79 In 1957, Malaysia also gained
its independence after 446 years under Portuguese,
Dutch, and British colonialism, and Japanese
occupation. Independence was given while the then
Malayan Federation was still in the midst of an ethnic
and ideological insurgency, although, like Ghana,
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Malaysia inherited a stable British civil structure and
a larder of natural resources.80 The per capita income
of these new states was about the same that eventful
year,81 but Ghana with an economic growth rate of 5
percent seemed to promise the brightest prospects of
the three.82 Yet 50 years later, Ghana’s Gross National
Income (GNI) stood at just U.S. $520 per person and
ranked 177th globally by the World Bank. Malaysia’s
GNI was 10 times greater at U.S. $5,490 and 80th in the
world, and South Korea’s GNI 34 times larger at U.S.
$17,690 and 49th.83 Why did one of the better regarded
African states with such early promise have such poor
economic performance compared to states that were
initially worse off? The explanation for these differences
in economic standing between the countries of Africa
and the rest of the world helps to explain some of the
causes for the problems endured by Africans today.
Economic activities are the most central of all
human endeavors. They are what satisfy the basic
human physical needs of food, shelter, protection,
and health. Economic activities also enable other
higher order human endeavors, including cultural
and political activities. Although rich in human and
geographic diversity, Africa has lagged the rest of
the world in its economic development, adversely
impacting its human development and stability. To
better understand economic problems in Africa, and to
offer potential solutions, this section explains African
development by comparing the few more-developed
and many lesser-developed traits and characteristics
of this continent in terms of economic, demographic,
and social measurements. This review complements
the next section which explores, on a macro scale,
some of Africa’s economic activities which describe
the nature of local African economies and their impact
on development and stability. Throughout these
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discussions, the causes and potential obstacles that
slow Africa’s economic and political development
are evaluated in order to recommend ways in which
the United States and other interested parties can
better organize themselves to support the African
states and assist in their development. Economic
and political development is the foundation upon
which future African security, stability, population
growth, environmental protection, and improvement
in standards of living depend. Africa’s natural and
human resources are among the last great underused
assets left on earth, and their proper development
should be of concern to the world.
Measuring Africa’s Economic Development.
To understand the economic development of Africa,
it is necessary to resort to statistics describing economic,
demographic, and social conditions. Such statistics are
often used freely in the media and academia to prove
points and explain enigmas, but too often the numbers
themselves are a mystery. How useful are such data
and what do they relate to the reader? The opening
example of this paper, comparing the economic
standing of Ghana, Malaysia, and South Korea is a
case in point. Is GNI a fair way to make such economic
comparisons across continents and half a century? If
so, what does it mean and can it explain the causes of
poverty and underdevelopment? Economic size and
growth is not the same as economic development,
although each suffers in Africa. Development is used
in a broad sense as the “progressive improvement of
the human condition in both material and nonmaterial
ways.”84 As this section demonstrates, economic growth
may occur without improving human, political, or
physical well-being. Economic development is closely
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associated with human development and together
they lay a foundation for an economy to sustainably
boost itself through more sophisticated value-added
activities by building social capital in education,
equality, freedoms, culture, security, stability, and
good governance; demographic well-being through
improved health and population distribution; and
economic capital in terms of better infrastructure,
investment,
diversification,
and
management.
Economic development seeks to lessen environmental
degradation, social and political inequality, and other
stresses that sometimes accompany unregulated
economic growth. These concepts put Africa’s regional
and representative states’ economic, political, and
social development into perspective. The measures
examined here include GNI, Gross Domestic Product
(GDP), Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) adjustments,
the Human Development Index (HDI) and its health
and education components, political measures such
as freedom and equality, and other economic and
demographic indicators. This analysis should prove
to be useful to planners and implementers of policy
who are trying to better understand and improve the
conditions encountered on the African continent.
By any measure of national income, the economies
of Africa perform poorly when compared to the rest
of the world. An economy is defined as “production,
development, and management of [the] material
wealth . . . system of a country or region.”85 Based
upon this definition, it is easy to conclude that the
best way to measure an economy is to aggregate its
production, development, and management of wealth
over a specific time period and for a defined area. If
such a summation is calculated for the total value of
goods and services produced over the period of a year
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for a designated state or region, that measure is known
as the Gross National Product (GNP) or GNI.86 This
measure quantifies all the value-added human activities
in the private (reported currency exchange), public
(government spending), and informal (barter and gray
market) sectors of an economy in goods, services, and
net return on investments originating from one state.87
Typically such measures are based on a common
currency like the U.S. dollar, requiring conversion rates
and estimates, and thereby introducing some degree
of error. Since large states with large populations are
expected to produce more goods and services, GNP
compares economic size and relative contribution of
countries to the global economy. However, total GNI
or GNP by itself is not a ready indicator of the wealth
or development status of a country. To meaningfully
compare the development status between states using
GNP, GNP per capita must be used. The numbers used
in the Ghana comparison at the beginning of this paper
were adjusted in this manner to enable fair comparisons
among the three states. GNP per capita compensates
for increase in population along with growth in the
economy at any given time so that chronological
and lateral comparisons can be made. GNP does not
incorporate non-marketed production as measures of
economic pursuit such as parenting and maintaining
one’s own dwelling.88 In terms of national income per
capita, Sub-Saharan Africa has fared poorly, showing
virtually no growth between 1960 and 2000, compared
to the doubling registered by other low income areas
of the world. Africa’s economy has only grown as fast
as its population. With only 10 percent of the world’s
population, Africa has 30 percent of the world’s poor.
The number of poor people doubled from 1980 to 2000
to 300 million, making Africa the only region in the
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world where the number of poor is rising over the long
term.89 In summary, GNP is a relatively straightforward
means to gauge the aggregate value-added economic
activities of a country over time in order to measure
economic progress and offer meaningful comparisons.
This measure reveals Africa’s relative and absolute
poverty.
Use of GNP to measure development has flaws that
are corrected through other related measurements.
GNP, for instance, includes the net return on
investments made overseas and infers increased wealth
for the originating state, even if there was no real value
added. This skews the perception of wealth to the
investing rather than producing country. To make the
distinction between value-added production within a
country rather than by a country, GDP is more often
used than GNP for comparisons.90 Otherwise, GDP
measures total market value, as does GNP, and both use
per capita measurements as an indicator of economic
development for a country. Among African states,
use of GDP should bolster the measures of economic
development since Africans are more likely recipients
of overseas investment and aid than originators
(kleptocrats excluded), so return on investments made
from abroad are credited to the local African economies.
Even with that edge, it is depressing to learn the per
capita GDP of Sub-Saharan Africa from 1960 to 2000
grew at a very low annual rate of 0.1 percent, while
the rest of the world averaged growth of 5 percent
annually from 1980 to 2000.91 Such a meager growth
rate means that the African economies could barely
outgrow the rate of their population expansion, and
helps to explain why Africa remains the world’s least
developed region. Another method used to correct
flaws in national income measurements is to weight
GNP or GDP to reduce the fluctuations induced by
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currency exchange or price distortions, a process
known as purchasing power parity (PPP). The PPP
attempts to measure the domestic purchasing power
capability in local currencies, giving a more genuine
evaluation to the measure of economic development
and a society’s standard of living.92 “It is based on the
idea that identical baskets of traded goods should cost
the same,”93 and if they are not the same the difference
should be used to adjust the national income measures.
PPP measurements reduce the error that spikes in the
transitory U.S. dollar exchange rate have in skewing
the perception of economic development and standard
of living, and account for the difficulty in obtaining
common basic requirements for living in a society.
Using the GDP, PPP usually reduces the perception of
poverty suffered when compared to unadjusted figures.
The differences in measuring economic development
in terms of per capita value of GNI, GDP, and GDPPPP are apparent in Table 1. The GNI and GDP at the
official rate vary somewhat between them, as expected.
However, the GDP at the official exchange rate diverges
significantly from the GDP PPP, in this example by
factors of 1.7 to 3.2. For the more developed United
States and United Kingdom, the differences between
the three measures are less. As is usually the case when
using GDP-PPP, the citizens of some developing states
actually have more purchasing power than the GNI
or GDP values may indicate—often making the PPP
measure an equalizing indicator. Not surprisingly,
Sub-Saharan Africa still ranks below the rest of the
world in average GDP-PPP at U.S. $1,998, significantly
below even the low-income-state world average of
$2,531. By any standard of economic measure, many
states in Africa seriously lag the rest of the world’s
development standard and rates.
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Gross National
Income

Gross Domestic
Product
Official Exchange

Gross Domestic
Product
Purchasing
Power Parity

Country
Algeria

3,030

3,800

8,100

Botswana

5,900

6,900

14,700

480

700

1,600

1,800

3,700

200

700

Chad
Congo, Rep
Ethiopia

950 (2005)
180

Ghana

520

600

1,400

Kenya

580

800

1,600

5,450

5,600

11,900

Nigeria

640

900

2,200

Sierra Leone

240

250

800

South Africa

5,390

6,200

10,600

UK

40,180

45,500

35,300

USA

44,970

45,800

46,000

Mauritius

Note: all figures in U.S. dollars and per capita data. GNI uses 2006
data; GDP uses 2007 data.
Sources: GNI: World Bank, “Key Development Data and Statistics.”
GDP PPI and GDP Official Rate: CIA, The 2008 World Fact Book, 2008.

Table 1. Comparison of Development Measures
of Economic Indicators.
Measuring Africa’s Human Development.
Using economic measurements like GNI and
GDP-PPP to gauge human development may still not
adequately describe a development situation. Not all
societies equally seek material wealth, and those that do
not desire it may seem less developed than they actually
are.94 For that reason, social and demographic measures
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are also used to give a more nuanced understanding of
development, which should generate better solutions
to weigh and counter poverty. If material goods are
not universally held in the same high regard, there
are other things that most modern societies do cherish
and are willing to expend scarce resources to attain.
Education and health care are two such attributes, and
are crucial to the development of a vibrant economy.
Both are human indicators of economic development,
since the amount of resources allocated to these
indicates the wealth of an economy, and dedicating
these resources are an investment in future economic
and human well-being. The health of a nation can be
measured by markers such as expenditures on medical
care as a percentage of national wealth, proportion of
patients to doctors or nurses, or even by calories and
protein received in an average daily diet. However,
such social indicators of development are often
indicated through related demographic statistics. For
example, a long average life span is an aggregated
gauge of the strength of a country’s health care, food
supply, sanitation, and public assistance support.
The difference in life expectancy between developed
countries and underdeveloped countries shows men
and women living significantly longer in wealthier
societies, which is a reflection of their social resources
and organization. Regionally, Sub-Saharan Africa’s life
expectancy is only 49.6 years, while that of high income
countries average 79.2 and low income countries 60.0.
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
data in Table 2 indicates that even otherwise promising
states, such as Botswana and South Africa, show a less
developed level of life expectancy, reflecting the grave
toll that AIDS and other diseases have wreaked on
those societies. Infant mortality rate (IMR), the number
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of babies that survive their first year per 1,000 live
births, and child mortality rates (CMR), the number of
children who live to their 5th year are other common
measures of health and welfare systems. Childhood
survival, however, is based more upon basic medical
care like immunizations, parental knowledge, and
ability to combat common forms of death from illness,
malnutrition, and diarrhea, so this measure is somewhat
less dependent on wealth and more on community
organization. Sub-Saharan Africa’s regional CMR is 172
deaths per 1,000, while that of high income countries is
only 7.95 An IMR of 60 deaths per 1,000 births is a mark
of lesser developed countries,96 and many Sub-Saharan
African countries exceed that. Table 2 indicates that
most African countries are way in excess of the U.S. and
UK IMR rate by 10 to 20 times. Thabo Mbeki, former
President of South Africa, stated that “the world’s
biggest killer and the greatest cause of ill health and
suffering across the globe . . . is extreme poverty,” a
sentiment shared by many researchers and medical
professionals.97 In most basic demographic indicators,
the people of Africa fare worst in the world.
A healthy work force is not sufficient, however, to
develop an economy; the work force must also be skilled
and literate to be productive. Two important measures
of the level of social development are the quantity
and quality of education. Quantity may be measured
by how long a student attends school, because, even
in mediocre schools, the longer a student attends, the
more likely he or she is to learn. To measure quantity
of education the UN uses the Gross Enrollment Ratio
(GER), which is the ratio of all students in primary,
secondary, and tertiary (college) levels of schooling
compared to the official population of school age
students for those three levels as established by the
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Life
Expectancy
(years)

Infant Mortality
Mortality Rate
(per 1,000)

Adult
Literacy
Total
Population
(percent)

Gross
Enrollment
Ratio
(percent)

Algeria

71.7

34

69.9

73.7

Botswana

48.1

87

81.2

69.5

Chad

50.4

124

25.7

37.5

Congo, Rep

54.0

81

84.7

51.4

Ethiopia

51.8

109

35.9

42.1

Ghana

59.1

68

57.9

50.7

Country

Kenya

52.1

79

73.6

60.6

Mauritius

72.4

13

84.3

75.3

Nigeria

46.5

100

69.1

56.2

Sierra Leone

41.8

165

34.8

44.6

South Africa

50.8

55

82.4

77.0

UK

79.0

5

99.0

93.0

USA

77.9

6

99.0

93.3

Source: UNDP, Human Development Reports, 2007/8, 2005 data. U.S. and
UK literacy rates from CIA The 2008 World Factbook, 2008.

Table 2. Comparison of Development Using
Demographic and Social Indicators.
measured country and expressed as a percentage.98 This
statistic helps to show how many eligible students may
actually be attending school and can be a predictor of
future literacy. Table 2 shows that the highest African
rates of GER are found in northern Africa, South Africa,
and Mauritius at around 75 percent enrollment—below
a developed country’s rate of 93-98 percent. However,
these countries are not representative of most of Africa
which falls far short with only 58 percent of African
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children enrolled in primary education and far fewer at
higher levels.99 Quality of education can be measured
by the student-teacher ratio or by the literacy rate, the
percentage of a country’s adults who can read and
write in their own language.100 High income societies
usually provide 12 years of schooling to their students,
and offer relatively easy access to higher education.
This results in a typical literacy rate of above 98 percent
for adult men and women. Sub-Saharan Africa’s
literacy is only 59.3 percent101 which explains why its
economic development is low, since high education
and literacy levels are needed to engage in more
lucrative high-value economic activities. The lower
GER rates in the youngest generation also forecasts
illiteracy, and a shortage of needed skills for future
higher order economic activities, trapping Africans in
another cycle of poverty. Together, literacy rates and
GER constitute what the UN refers to as the Education
Index and are important indicators of a population’s
current ability to participate in advanced economic
activities and its potential to improve future human
and economic conditions. So important are health and
education to an underdeveloped population that the
UN Millennium Development Goals, which aim to
half absolute poverty worldwide by 2015, specifically
target universal primary education, greater gender
balance in schools, and reduction in the CMR as key
development goals.102
Measurements of development that combine both
social and demographic characteristics are urbanization
and Total Fertility Rate (TFR). Both reflect population
growth or distribution, but are highly influenced by
cultural norms and organization. Urbanization is the
total population of a country or region living within
a city or its immediate surroundings (the definition
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of which varies by country). Economically cities
represent a dense pool of laborers needed by industry,
and allow economic specialization of services like
banking, insurance, and a stock exchange that are the
hallmark of advanced economies. In wealthy countries,
urbanization usually exceeds 75 percent of its total
population. Some countries in Africa just reach 60
percent urbanization (see Table 3), but none have yet
built world class manufacturing in those urban regions.
At 244 million people or 30 percent of the population,
Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest urban population
among the world’s regions, but the highest city
growth rate.103 Another social and demographic trait
is TFR (or Population Replacement Ratio), which is the
number of children the average woman in a country
or region will bear during her lifetime. A rate of 2.1
children is considered a long-term zero-population
growth rate while a rate greater than 2.1 is considered
to be indicative of a growing population and another
indicator of a less developed country (see Table 3).
Sub-Saharan Africa’s TFR average is 5.5, significantly
higher than that of middle income states (2.1) and even
low income states (3.8).104 That so many babies are
born is an indicator that agriculture is the mainstay of
an economy, low standard of health care since many
children do not survive, low level of government
support so that children act as old age insurance, and
cultural preference for large families. The negative
aspects of large families are that they disperse the
concentration of available funds, delaying a surplus
of massed capital needed for development. High
urbanization reinforces a low TFR, since city dwellers
rarely have the room or economic motivation to have
large families. Social and demographic indicators such
as urbanization and TFR, are just a few among a host
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of other economic, social, and demographic measures
used to better understand a specific area’s development
through a broader perspective. Social and demographic
traits often are the foundation upon which a modern
economy is built, and are therefore excellent indicators
to supplement economic measures of development.
Since health, education, and urbanization require
community resources and organization, they are also
signs of how much wealth and ability a community
has to fulfill these aspirations.
Since 1990 the UN has published the HDI as
a shorthand single aggregate measure of human
development to facilitate chronological and lateral
comparisons. The HDI includes the economic measure
of GDP-PPP to determine standard of living; a social
measure using the Educational Index including both
GER and literacy rates; and a demographic dimension
for health in the form of life expectancy. Combined,
these provide a broader index ranging from a value
of 1 (best score) to 0 (dismal) to show human and
economic development levels (Table 3). Sub-Saharan
Africa ranks lowest among the world’s regions with
an HDI of 0.493, due to having the world’s lowest
standard of living and worst health and education
levels. The region of North Africa, including Egypt,
rates significantly higher with an HDI of 0.740.105 In
comparison, the regions of Anglo-America, Japan, and
Western Europe each place around 0.93-0.94 in HDI106
and among middle and low income countries at 0.776
and 0.579, respectively. Although often cited for its
broadness, even the HDI has limitations since it includes
just a few important measures of the many available,
and thus still gives a less than comprehensive picture.
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Urbanization
(percent
population)

Total
Fertility
Rate
(births per
woman)

Human
Development
Index
(ranking in world)

Algeria

40.3

2.5

0.733 (104)

Botswana

57.4

3.2

0.654 (124)

Chad

25.3

6.5

0.388 (170)

Congo, Rep

60.2

4.8

0.548 (139)

Ethiopia

16.0

5.8

0.406 (169)

Ghana

47.8

4.4

0.553 (135)

Kenya

20.7

5.0

0.521 (148)

Mauritius

42.4

1.9

0.804 ( 65)

Nigeria

48.2

5.8

0.470 (158)

Sierra Leone

40.7

6.5

0.366 (177,
bottom)

South Africa

59.3

2.8

0.674 (121)

Sudan

40.8

4.8

0.526 (147)

UK

98.7

1.7

0.946 ( 16)

USA

80.8

2.0

0.949 ( 12)

Country

Note: HDI and urbanization is 2005 data, TFR is 2000-05 data.
Urbanization data is based on national definitions of an urban area and
vary by country.
Source: UNDP, Human Development Reports, 2007-08.

Table 3. Comparison of Development Using
Urbanization, TFR, and HDI Indicators.
The UNDP’s 2007 Human Development Report judges
its own HDI measure. “It does not, for example,
include important indicators such as gender or income
inequality and more difficult to measure indicators
like respect for human rights and political freedoms.
What it does provide is a broadened prism for viewing
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human progress and the complex relationship between
income and well-being.”107 Because it accounts for at
least one significant economic, social, and demographic
measure, the HDI is a better balanced, although still
limited, single indication of economic and human
development levels. Even when this measure is used,
Sub-Saharan Africa is still perceived to be the least
developed region in the world.
Measuring Other Development Indicators in Africa.
To add a deeper understanding of the economic
and human development of a state, additional indexes
may be used to compensate for the acknowledged
weaknesses in the HDI. The Gender Development
Index (GDI, see Table 4), which compares the level of
human development between women and men, is one
such method using the same criteria found in the HDI.
The greater the disparity between men and women
in these measures, the lower the GDI. For example,
even though both relatively prosperous, Botswana
and Mauritius have about the same overall literacy
rate (from Table 2), the GDI indicator for Mauritius is
reduced since its literacy figures are skewed (Table 4)
with 88.2 percent of males literate compared to 80.5
percent of females, while Botswana’s is more balanced
at 80.4 percent males and 81.8 percent females although
both are notably high for African societies).108 In parts
of Africa where overall literacy runs at half or less of
the population, for example in Ethiopia, Sierra Leone,
or Chad, female literacy is only half to a quarter that
of males. The Gross Enrollment Ratio confirms this
current trend and bodes slow future improvement
for African women overall with only 25 to 75 percent
of age-eligible females enrolled in school, lower than
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that of males. This means that the female half of the
population of these countries have less opportunity
to reach the levels needed to contribute to economic
development than males have, which retards growth
potential since not all available human resources
are used. Such differences may result from a fiscal
allocation system where limited available resources are
expended mainly on males, or may have a cultural bias
where fiscal resources are spent elsewhere rather than
advancing the education of females. In many African
economies, lower education directly results in lower
earned income for females (Table 4) by a difference
of two to three times. When they can work outside
the home, less education often means women remain
in menial or entry level jobs and cannot progress to
higher level technical or management positions. Lack
of education also reduces the opportunity for women
to hold elected or appointed positions in government.
Among the development measures, African females
fare better than their male counterparts only in life
expectancy. But this is also true everywhere in the
world where rudimentary modern medical care
and public health are practiced. Not surprisingly, of
all of the regions in the world, Sub-Saharan Africa
ranks lowest in GDI,109 and of all the countries, Niger
is lowest at 0.278.110 Such a low GDI indicates that
African women have less influence in the affairs of
their communities, which in turn hinders economic
and human development.
Other inequalities found in the HDI are also
balanced by examining factors addressing income
distribution and human freedom—each is a factor
influencing economic and human development as
well as stability. With income inequality, a state may
have a relatively high GDP per capita, but the rich elite
may be the primary beneficiary, while the rest of the
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population is significantly below the national average
and suffer inadequate education and health care. The
poverty line is an absolute way of measuring such
disparity, based on the definition of being poor in each
country. A relatively easy way to measure the degree
of income inequality, to allow comparisons across
borders, is a Gini Index used by the UNDP as a ratio of
values of 0 to 100, with 100 meaning perfect inequality
(one person earns everything, and the rest nothing).

Country

Earned Income
(Estimated
US$)
Male / Female

Life
Expectancy
(in Years)
Male /
Female

Adult
Literacy
( Percent
Total Pop)
Male /
Female

Gender
Development
Index (rank)

Algeria

10,515 / 3,546

70.4 / 73.0

79.6 / 60.1

0.720 ( 94)

Botswana

19,094 / 5,913

47.6 / 48.4

80.4 / 81.8

0.639 (108)

Chad

1,735 / 1,126

49.0 / 51.8

40.8 / 12.8

0.370 (151)

Congo, Rep

1,691 /

841

52.8 / 55.2

90.5 / 79.0

0.540 (119)

Ethiopia

1,316 /

796

50.5 / 53.1

50.0 / 22.8

0.393 (148)

Ghana

2,893 / 2,056

58.7 / 59.5

66.4 / 49.8

0.549 (116)

Kenya

1,354 / 1,126

51.1 / 53.1

77.0 / 70.2

0.521 (126)

18,098 / 7,407

69.1 / 75.8

88.2 / 80.5

0.804 ( 65)

Mauritius
Nigeria

1,592 /

652

46.6 / 47.1

78.2 / 60.1

0.456 (138)

Sierra Leone

1,114 /

507

40.2 / 43.4

46.7 / 24.2

0.320 (156)

South Africa

15,446 / 6,927

49.5 / 52.0

84.1 / 80.9

0.667 (106)

UK

40,000 /26,242

76.7 / 81.2

99.0 / 99.0

0.944 ( 10)

USA

40,000 /25,005

75.2 / 80.4

99.0 / 99.0

0.937 ( 16)

Note: all figures based on 2005 data. U.S. and UK male Earned Income shows
most allowed.
Sources: UNDP, Human Development Reports, 2007-08. U.S. and UK literacy
rates from CIA The 2008 World Factbook, 2007 data.

Table 4. Comparison of Development Measures
Using Gender Development Index Measures.
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The World Bank ranked Namibia as having the
world’s most unequal distribution of wealth in 2006
with a Gini index of 74.3, a result of its white minority
owning most of the country’s land and commercial
farms.111 Botswana and South Africa also have unequal
income distribution for similar reasons, explaining
why Africa, with Latin America, has the world’s most
unbalanced income distribution.112 Anecdotal evidence
from oil rich Nigeria shows that despite suffering a net
decline in GNI per capita over past decades, six of the
world’s 100 richest people are Nigerian, and each one
is politically powerful.113 Economic inequality often is
associated with political inequality in Africa, leaving
the poor not only destitute but powerless to change
their situation.
Attempts to better balance the HDI using more
subjective factors such as political freedom have
created measures like the UNDP’s Human Freedom
Index (HFI). First tabulated in 1991 to address the
lack of human rights when measuring development
through the HDI, the UNDP concluded there was a
high correlation between human development and
human freedom.114 Some political freedoms, such as
property rights, may directly contribute to economic
development.115 Political freedom bolsters human
development, and human development reinforces
political freedom. However, the UNDP HFI is no
longer tabulated, probably because it proved to be too
politically contentious. For the past 35 years the NGO
Freedom House has offered a similar index on a 1 to
7 scale to measure political rights and civil liberties
(where 1 is free and 7 is not free, see Table 5). In its 2006
analysis, 46 countries were rated in the 6 or 7 category
for political rights, and 19 of those were found on the
African continent. That means Africa is host to nearly
half of the world’s repressive regimes but represents
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only a little over a quarter of the world’s states. Some
blame the cause for such abuses on a lack of economic
resources resulting in a “human rights rationing.”116
Indeed, among Africa’s three wealthiest states in terms
of GDP-PPP and HDI, Mauritius, Botswana, and South
Africa, are also found the freest societies in Africa—but
there are exceptions. For example, Algeria is ranked
second in HDI and fourth in per capita wealth which
are two indicators of economic development. Yet
Algeria is still is categorized by Freedom House as not
free. In part, lack of emphasis on freedom may be due
to African aspirations that value democracy more for
its potential to deliver necessities like water, shelter,
and education than for its freedoms.117 Although
not entirely correlated to economic development,
some factors such as income distribution and human
freedom do offer a fuller understanding of a country’s
development situation.
The economic, social, and demographic characteristics introduced so far are just a few of many possible ways of measuring development so as to gain a
more holistic view of economic conditions. The more
characteristics that are evaluated, including some of
the material gains examined in this paragraph, the
better is the resulting analysis of a country’s economic
state of affairs. One such economic factor to consider
is productivity, defined as the value of a particular
product or service compared to the amount of labor
needed to produce it. Workers in developed countries
have access to tools and capabilities through capital
that make their work more productive and generate
more wealth than that of workers in underdeveloped
countries who rely on less efficient human and animal
power.118 One characteristic of productivity tracked
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Country

Income Inequality
(0=equality)

Political Rights/Civil
Liberties/
Freedom Index

Algeria

35.3

6 / 5 / Not Free

Botswana

60.5

2 / 2 / Free

Chad

n/a

6 / 5 / Not Free

Congo, Rep

n/a

6 / 6 / Not Free

Ethiopia

30.0

5 / 5 / Part Free

Ghana

40.8

1 / 2 / Free

Kenya

42.5

3 / 3 / Part Free

Mauritius

n/a

1 / 1 / Free

Nigeria

43.7

4 / 4 / Part Free

Sudan

n/a

7 / 7 / Not Free

Sierra Leone

62.9

4 / 3 / Part Free

South Africa

57.8

1 / 2 / Free

UK

36.0

1 / 1 / Free

USA

40.8

1 / 1 / Free

Note: Income Inequality data is from 2005, and Political Rights data
from 2006.
Sources: Income Inequality data from UNDP, Human Development
Reports, 2007-0/8. Political Rights/Civil Liberties from Freedom in
World Country Ratings, Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2006.

Table 5. Comparison of Development Using Income
Inequality and Freedom Measurements.
by the UNDP is Electricity Consumption Per Capita,
which tells how much power is used to run tools and
equipment at work and home. Africa’s most industrialized and wealthiest societies, here represented
by Mauritius, South Africa, and Algeria, are also the
ones that consume the most electricity. Electricity
consumption, along with Internet and cell phone
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usage (see Table 6), portend a large investment in
physical infrastructure suggesting national wealth
and confidence to invest due to a perception of
future stability. Consumer goods such as appliances,
transportation, computers, and phones are also
essential to a modern economy since they allow access
to jobs, services, and information.
Consumption of such goods is a result of high
economic development, but they in turn promote even
higher levels of development through their increased
efficiency and availability of more workers. Such
gadgets also indicate a societal proclivity for embracing
change, which is another prerequisite for economic
advancement along Western norms. Countries with
more than 500 telephones, 400 motor vehicles, and 300
Internet users per 1,000 people are more developed,
while those with less than 100 of each per 1,000 are
considered underdeveloped.119 Such consumer goods,
like those in Table 6, reinforce earlier conclusions that
categorize all of Africa as underdeveloped, but do
differentiate Mauritius, South Africa, and Algeria as
the more developed within Africa. One bright spot for
Sub-Saharan Africa is that its regional cellular phone
use average of 130 per 1,000 people is almost twice
that of other low income countries, which may suggest
a willingness to embrace technology, although the
number of Internet users at 26 per thousand is half that
of the other low income countries, which averages 45.120
Such differences in communication may be explained
by the fact that a cellular network is cheaper to join
and requires less infrastructure and skill than Internet
usage. Indicators such as productivity through energy
and goods consumption are just a few among a host
of other economic, social, and demographic measures
used to better understand Africa’s low economic
development level.
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Country

Electricity
Consumption
Per Capita
(kilowatt-hrs)

Internet Users
(per 1,000)

Cell Phone
Subscribers
(per 1,000)

Algeria

899

58

416

Botswana

n/a

34

466

Chad

11

4

22

229

13

123

36

2

6

Ghana

289

18

129

Kenya

169

32

135

1,775

146

574

157

38

141

Sierra Leone

24

2

22

South Africa

4,818

109

724

116

77

50

UK

6,756

473

1,088

USA

14,240

630

680

Congo, Rep
Ethiopia

Mauritius
Nigeria

Sudan

Notes: Figures based on 2005 data, except Electricity Consumption,
which are 2004 data.
Sources: UNDP, Human Development Reports, 2007-08.

Table 6. Comparison of Development Using
Consumption Indicators.
Economic Measures Summary.
Development encompasses more than just economic
improvement; it is also composed of social and
demographic advances, political freedoms, economic
opportunity, and even perhaps a sense of collective
contentment. Development therefore requires both
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material wealth and nonmaterial enhancement because
they reinforce one another in bettering society. When
gauging improvement, development measures have
their limitations in that each only partly describes this
complex phenomenon. For the best understanding
of development, different perspectives are needed,
including economic measures such as a country’s GNP
per capita, GDP-PPP, income equality, and consumption
of goods; social measures including GER, literacy,
urbanization, gender equality, and political rights;
and the demographic characteristics of life expectancy,
CMR, IMR, and TFR among others. For ease of use,
these measures can be grouped into a single indicator,
such as the HDI or GDI, but even those do not explain
fully the situation unless considered with other trends.
Africa’s development may also not completely follow
Western norms, which emphasized production of
goods and services using the 20th century model that
burdened future generations and the environment.121
Despite reliance on quantifiable measurements and a
Western-centric view of what development is, Africa
still presents a picture of low economic and human
development in both absolute terms and relative to
other regions of the world. Sub-Saharan Africa’s HDI
of 0.491 lags behind the HDI average of the world’s low
income states at 0.570,122 making it the poorest of the
poor. Even worse, the trend is towards more economic
poverty. The number of people living in extreme
poverty (earning less than U.S. $1 a day) has increased
in most of Sub-Saharan Africa since 2000 when 189
countries pledged to promote development, freedom,
and peace through the Millennium Development Goals.
In fact, none of the eight major human development
goals for Africa are on track to be reached by the target
date of 2015.123 Such gaps may seriously undermine the
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ability of African states to attain stability and security
or to improve their governance, which is an ominous
sign for the United States and the rest of the world.
In Africa, economic growth is not necessarily
about gaining more or better material possessions,
desirable as this may be in reducing poverty. Economic
growth is just as concerned with the intelligent
sustainable growth that also ensures demographic and
societal development with it. A World Bank report
emphasizes:
Development is about improving the quality of people’s
lives, expanding their ability to shape their own futures.
This generally calls for higher per capita income, but it
involves much more. It involves more equitable education and job opportunities. Greater gender equality.
Better health and nutrition. A cleaner, more sustainable
natural environment. A more impartial judicial and legal system. Broader civil and political freedoms. A richer
cultured life.124

As late as the 1960s, the Republic of Korea was also
afflicted with many of the same problems faced by
most African states today. However, by 2007 South
Korea’s GNI of U.S. $410 million was larger than all
of the economies of Sub-Saharan Africa combined
at $310 million.125 South Korea “is now a model of
development as one of the world’s most prosperous
Newly Industrialized Countries. . . .”126 The African
states are the last to start this climb, but the models and
assistance needed for economic, social, and demographic
development are available if the countries of Africa can
put their own fundamentals in order. To further explain
why such poverty persists despite native advantages
including substantial natural resources and a relatively
low population density, and to explain how the United
States and other non-African nations can help Africa
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develop, the next section analyzes some of the causes
responsible for hobbling the African people in their
human progress and possible solutions to improve the
situation.
AFRICA’S ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES
Economic Activities and Development.
Although a society’s security, welfare, and
development are more than an agglomeration of
its economic activities, it is the economy that is the
foundation for social, demographic, political, and
material gains. A country’s economy provides the
funding for new wells, clinics, schools, ballots, and
the income to buy life enhancing goods and services.
Africa lags the rest of the world in development in
large part because its economies are the smallest and
least productive in the world. This comparative global
disadvantage has grown rapidly since the great age of
European discovery began in the 1450s. At that time, the
difference between Europe and Africa was small, with
Europeans impressed by the African empires’ wealth,
organization, and strength so that Europeans traded
with Africans as equals and the Portuguese entered
into alliances with African states.127 Today, despite the
often negative indicators of Africa’s situation, there are
some success stories on the continent and a general,
although not universal, trend toward economic growth
averaging over 5 percent annually between 2000 and
2007.128 It is necessary to determine the important factors
that are the basis of this success in order to continue this
progress. Since its inclusion into the world economy
by Arab traders in the 11th century and European
merchants in the 15th century,129 Africa’s economy
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has been grounded primarily on agriculture and has
been a key source of the world’s raw materials. Early
European names for parts of the continent—the Grain
Coast, Gold Coast, and Ivory Coast—attest to these
enduring relationships. These resources were a main
cause for European imperialism and why some leaders
today accuse outside powers of continuing their control
in Africa through a form of neo-colonialism. Unlike
Europe, however, Africa’s main economic activities
have over the centuries remained the same primary
ones. It is the continued reliance on such economic
pursuits that may explain why Africa is economically
underdeveloped. In Africa, farming remains the most
important economic activity, and mineral and energy
resources its biggest exports. Such activities are the most
basic form of human production to meet fundamental
needs, but tend to advance economic development
very slowly. Elsewhere in the world, economic, social,
political, and demographic improvement has been
fueled by engaging in higher order economic activities
such as manufacturing, building, and production
(secondary economic activities), or services to and
from individuals, businesses, and government (tertiary
economic activities) to include communications,
transportation, education, research, and personal
services. This section examines Africa’s primary,
secondary, and tertiary economic activities, to show
how the reliance on the primary activities has put it
at a disadvantage, but how better administration and
governance, diversification into higher order economic
activities, and foreign assistance can leverage human
and natural resources to further develop Africa and
enhance its security and stability.
There are several components that contribute to
development, especially economic development: the
natural environment, people, and culture. The natural
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environment is particularly important to the success
of primary economic activities,130 which include
agriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting and gathering,
grazing, mining, and drilling. These primary activities
limit economic development through the vagaries of
physical distribution, which expose such activities to
risk and shortages. Primary economic activities also
earn less from human input and capital for the overall
cost of the commodity than higher order activities.
Less added-value derives less profit from primary
commodities than from manufactured goods or services.
Often, the economic value of these commodities
depends on the rise and fall of international demand,
since domestic and regional demand in Africa for its
own commercial primary products is small. Economic
policies of industrialized countries are made in their
own favor, which makes participation in the global
economy by poorer countries less advantageous.
Even occasional high world-wide primary commodity
prices, as occurred in the 1970s and in the 2000s,
may not contribute enough to economic and human
development over time since inevitable drops make
investment in such activities risky, and their rollercoaster economic returns are too unreliable for modern
development schemes that depend upon stability.
Thus, throughout history and around the world there
has been a strong correlation between a predominant
engagement in primary economic activities and
relatively low economic and human development of a
region or country. Although the most basic of human
pursuits, the inconsistent returns, less-predictable
supply, lower added-value, and dependence on outside
demand for primary commodities like food, fibers,
timber, hydrocarbons, and mineral resources, make
primary economic activities a weaker and less reliable
means by which to advance economic development.
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Agriculture.
Workers who engage in agriculture for the primary
purpose of feeding their families are considered
subsistence farmers and are at the lowest end of
development. They typically employ small or desolate
plots of land using little machinery, capital, or fertilizer.
Subsistence agriculture may include intensive farming
such as rice growing, slash and burn methods in the
jungle, and pastoralism. Subsistence farmers engage
sporadically in the national economy and do not
contribute in an appreciable way to a state’s tax base
or economic development. A country is considered
developed if it employs less than 10 percent of its labor
in agriculture, and is underdeveloped if more than
half are farmers.131 “A high percentage of agricultural
workers in a country indicates that most of its people
must spend their days producing food for their own
survival . . . not in more wealth creating enterprises
like manufacturing and services.”132 On average,
African agriculture employs about two-thirds of
all workers, but accounted for less than a quarter of
GDP in 1999 according to the World Bank.133 Table
7 shows 80 percent of the work force in Ethiopia,
Chad, and Sudan is engaged in agriculture, with 75
percent for Kenya and 70 percent for Nigeria. The
relatively low contribution of agriculture to the GDP
for so much human involvement demonstrates the
relative inefficiency of subsistence farming in the state
economy. Drought, disease, and pests make all types
of farming risky, but especially subsistence farming,
which has fewer resources and depth with which to
mitigate such disasters. The poverty of subsistence
farming is compounded by a growing population
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that often accompanies traditional farming, so less
food is available per capita. Subsistence farmers
must therefore adopt more intense or more modern
farming methods, or face possible dire consequences
such as famine,134 which has plagued Sub-Saharan
Africa for several decades. The need to adapt “is all
the greater because the AIDS pandemic is cutting
down the number of agricultural workers in Africa,
reducing Africa’s ability not only to feed itself but
also to cope with periodic natural calamities.”135 An
extreme consequence of subsistence agriculture overburdened by population growth is evident in Rwanda,
Africa’s very agriculture-dependent and most densely
populated state.136 Paul Magnarella, former President
of the Association of Third World Studies, concludes
that the cause of the “Rwandan genocide was the
increasing imbalance in land, food, and people that led
to malnutrition, hunger, periodic famine, and fierce
competition for farming land. Rwanda’s leaders chose
to respond to these conditions by eliminating the Tutsi
portion of the population as well as their Hutu political
rivals.”137 It is difficult for primary economic activities
to significantly advance economic development
because of the risk and low economic return from such
commodities. Subsistence agriculture remains the
predominant form of economic activity in Africa, but
contributes the least to an economy and tax base. This
condition plays a large part in underdevelopment in
Sub-Saharan Africa, and in its instability.
For this mainstay of Africa’s economy to overcome
hunger and contribute to society’s development, a
surplus in food production is a requirement. A surplus
will not only feed Sub-Saharan Africa’s population,
but generate revenue by selling the surplus, and allow
unneeded labor to engage in higher order economic
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activities.138 Elsewhere in the world similar cultures were
converted from subsistence farming into the modest
base upon which more developed economies were built.
Since the 1940s, the engine for such transformation has
been the Green Revolution, originally a U.S.-Mexican
project to attain food security by developing highyield, disease-resistant grain varieties.139 Through
scientific research and the technological application
of “mechanized equipment, chemical fertilizers,
insecticides, herbicides, and hybrid seeds . . . yield[s
of] two to four times more than traditional crops”
were realized.140 Despite its success in Asia and Latin
America, the Green Revolution has not promoted a
dramatic increase in food in Africa.141 One reason is that
African tuber staples, cassava, yams, and cocoyams,
are not part of the diet of other underdeveloped parts
of the world and were not addressed. The industrial
nature of the Green Revolution crops grown in parts of
Africa, such as rice, requires heavy capital investment
for machinery, chemical enhancements, specialized
seeds, and access to larger plots of land.142 Consequently,
these Green Revolution crops are not as suitable for
poverty-stricken Africans. The need for basic literacy
to read manuals and understand more complicated
methods is also helpful, as is a willingness to embrace
change. However, the prerequisites for capital, land,
and education are often out of reach of most Africans,
creating a dilemma that prevents them from advancing.
To gain the resources needed to participate in the Green
Revolution, farmers may depend on government or
international assistance, or incrementally transform
into commercial agriculture by growing food for
international trade.143 Whichever way, “increasing
agricultural productivity is the engine of economic
development in agricultural economies. Agricultural
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productivity improvement and rural development are
also the most effective ways to improve conditions for
poor people.”144 The Green Revolution is a proven way
of moving towards higher development, but initiating
that change requires assistance.
Unlike subsistence agriculture, commercial crops
are grown primarily for sale and depend on capital
driven inputs like machinery, chemical enhancements,
and large plots of land—all of which increases crop
production while reducing the percentage of laborers
involved.145 Such produce may include grains, fruits
and vegetables, nuts, fibers, meat and dairy, timber,
fish, or more of nature’s bounty that grows on land or
sea and whose harvest exceeds local needs. Malawi
offers a classic example of commercial agriculture
through tobacco, which accounts for 70 percent of all of
its export revenues. However, Malawi is also a caution
against using mono-agriculture to fuel economic
development, since so much needed revenue depends
on the survival of a single crop and the vagaries of
global competition.146 Perhaps for this reason Malawi
places low in the HDI (at 0.437 ranking 164 of 177
countries), and last world-wide in GDP-PPP, earning
only U.S. $667 per capita annually.147 Ethiopia’s coffee
crop is also a major part of its foreign revenue, which
has stunted Ethiopia’s economic growth because of
recent droughts, exacerbated by a simmering war
with Eritrea, and depressed international demand.148
Uganda’s exports depend upon primary commodities
too, accounting for 83 percent, but it “diversified its
agricultural sector to include nontraditional exports,
such as fruits, vegetables, tobacco, and flowers . . . .”
—a safer strategy.149 In Table 7, the Primary Exports
category is an indicator of the amount of commercial
agriculture (but also mineral and energy resources and
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logging, depending on which state is examined) sold
abroad. For Ethiopia, 60 percent of its exports are from
commercial crops like coffee; but that excludes the vast
number of subsistence farmers who grow few cash
crops.150 Another typical example is Ghana’s 35 percent
of export revenue from agriculture, mainly cocoa, in
which few of Ghana’s 55 percent of agricultural workers
participate.151 Commercial agriculture is currently only
a boon to an elite portion of Africa’s population.
Commercial and subsistence agriculture often exist
side by side in a dual economic system, which explains
why some countries have both a high percentage of
workers engaged in agriculture and yet depend very
much on exports from agricultural goods. As noted
earlier, such commercial enterprises may be the engine
for gaining resources needed to transform subsistence
agriculture through a new Green Revolution,
whereby “foreign innovations are first adapted on
large scale farms . . . before descending to the level
of small holder.”152 The dark side to a dual structure
is that the wealthy elite who gain the resources to be
commercial farmers or ranchers also have the power
to control poor subsistence farmers or drive them to
marginal land that is quickly overworked153 before a
transition occurs. On the other hand, during the 2000s,
Zimbabwe demonstrated the negative impact on food
security and exports of unwisely breaking up large
commercial farms. Within families, such dualism
also exists, which is a legacy of colonial policies and
reinforces gender inequality today.154 For example,
women are often relegated to traditional subsistence
farming to feed the family, growing up to 80 percent of
Africa’s total food supply, while men work for wages
or grow commercial crops as part of the transition
from subsistence farming.155 Creating surplus food in
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agriculture-dependent Africa is the key to economic
development. Participating in a new Green Revolution
is one way to transition to more lucrative commercial
agriculture and assure access to food, but for success
a balanced transition from subsistence to commercial
agriculture must occur.
Since agriculture is crucial to the well-being of
Africans, its proper management is the key place
from which to develop the continent’s economies and
societies. Africa’s agricultural underperformance is a
function of the region’s corruption of the dual economic
system, climate and bad weather, and institutional
factors such as low levels of investment, instability,
inefficient use of resources, and mal-governance.156 The
antidote to these problems is better national governance
and administration and international assistance to prod
Africa’s stagnant development trend. Maintaining
basic internal stability, external peace, transparency,
and representative government are necessary first steps
in gaining local and foreign investment in agriculture,
but one that many African governments seem unable
to achieve. To encourage change towards these goals,
the United States started the Millennium Challenge
Account (MCA), which offers “a 50 percent increase
in development assistance for those countries meeting
its qualifications . . . [which] stress good governance,
peace, security, the rule of law, human rights. . . .”157 In
Africa, Benin, Ghana, Mali, and Senegal have gained
eligibility in MCA for their improvement efforts. With
basic good governance in place, external assistance
could help to ensure that commercial agriculture
becomes a boost to development and not just another
form of supporting the elite. For instance, professional
agricultural planning that respects or restores the
environment is crucial to increase production and
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Employment
In
Agriculture
(% total
employ)

Primary
Exports
(% exports)

GDP from
Agriculture
(% of
total)

Algeria

14

98

8

Petroleum, natural
gas

Botswana

n/a

13

2

Diamonds, copper,
nickel, soda, ash

Chad

80

n/a

22

Oil, cattle, cotton,
gum arabic

Congo, Rep

n/a

n/a

6

Ethiopia

80

89

49

Coffee, qat, gold,
livestock, oilseed

Ghana

56

88

37

Gold, cocoa, timber,
tuna, manganese

Kenya

75

79

24

Tea, horticultural
products coffee,
fish

9

29

5

Sugar, cut flowers,
fish

Nigeria

70

98

18

Petroleum, cocoa,
rubber

Sierra Leone

n/a

93

49

Diamonds, rutile,
cocoa, fish

South Africa

9

43

2

Gold, diamonds,
platinum, metals

80

99

31

UK

1

18

1

USA

1

15

1

Country

Mauritius

Sudan

Primary Economic
Activity Exports

Petroleum, lumber,
sugar, cocoa

Petroleum, cotton,
sesame, livestock

Notes: Data based on most recent years from 2000-07. Botswana, Congo, and
Sierra Leone’s agriculture employment data are not available, but each at least
exceeds half of the work force.
Sources: Primary Exports: UNDP, Human Development Reports, 2007-08.
Employment, GDP from Agriculture, and Exports: CIA’s World Factbook, 2008.

Table 7. Comparison of Primary Economic
Employment and Production Indicators.
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ensure that any gains made can be sustained for future
generations. State governments should be proactive
through reforestation, re-vegetation, soil conservation,
and through their organizational responses to
problems, rather than a reactive posture as has usually
been the case.158 Such steps will mitigate the effects of
adverse weather and somewhat prepare for changes in
the environment. Since farmers and state governments
often lack the resources and capital to spur a Green
Revolution and more efficient commercial agriculture,
foreign aid may prove very useful at the start. One
example of such assistance is the U.S. Government’s
Africa Seeds of Hope Act which aims to increase
agricultural productivity and rural development
through food security for subsistence agriculture and
higher income for commercial endeavors. Through this
act, USAID consults with the rural poor to establish
micro credit with private entities and NGOs, extends
the benefits of the Green Revolution to African crops,
enables increased flexibility in food aid, and ensures
accountability towards progress.159 Other international,
foreign government, and nongovernmental organizations are also active in similar initiatives, and
all efforts should be cooperatively optimized. A
partnership of African governments willing to improve
governance and international assistance is one way to
help continue Africa’s development.
A second way to promote development and to
establish food security for Africans while creating a
surplus of commercial crops for international trade
is by enhancing the demand-side of agriculture.
International demand for African agricultural products
may better ensure that development is sustainable in
the long run and does not simply continue ineffective
aid and grants. The United States and EU could play
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a much larger, if more controversial, role by opening
up their domestic markets to African agricultural
goods, similar to the access that African manufactured
products have. This would eliminate a World Bank
estimated U.S. $270 billion of trade-distorting price
supports, and spur African economies.160 However,
every change made to the precarious balance of Africa’s
economies needs to be carefully considered. In such a
case, African farmers
would require substantial financial, human, and physical
investment in developing land for growing agricultural
products, and agro-industrial development for processing, packaging, meeting health and sanitary standards,
and marketing to the supermarkets of the world. It
would require human capital and expertise in farming,
food processing, and food product marketing of precisely the kind that Africa has been carelessly exporting.161

Uganda’s past policy and Zimbabwe’s present policy
of land reapportionment have driven away much
of the human capital needed to achieve such a goal,
whereas Kenya’s and Namibia’s policies have better
retained the needed expertise, although perpetuating
other problems. Developing agriculture is the key to
advancing Africa’s economic and human development.
To achieve these goals, African governments must
govern better, and ensure an efficient and equitable
transition to food security and commercial agriculture.
International assistance can spur the transformation
by offering aid to initiate the process and opening
markets to African products. This may be the key piece
in a complex puzzle of helping Africa develop security
and stability.
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Extractive Resources.
Just as important as agriculture in underpinning
Africa’s economies is its vast mineral and energy
wealth. These are primary commodities that may
be the foundation upon which to develop a society
or economy if properly managed, but often they are
not. Because Africa is relatively land and resource
abundant but underachieving in human efforts,
natural resources play a larger role in its fortunes
than in any other region except the Middle East.162
Between 1965 and 2000 “most of the growth that has
taken place in export trade has come primarily from
extractive processes and agriculture” with primary
commodities accounting for more than 90 percent of
foreign revenues in many African countries.163 These
resources are “naturally occurring, exploitable material
that society perceives as useful to its economic and
material well-being.”164 Some resources are renewable,
like solar, wind, and geo-thermal energy. Africa has
much potential to harness these for its benefit, using
its mighty rivers like the Congo or Niger to generate
electricity, but also through numerous small rivers
such as Liberia’s St. Paul River, which once supplied
half of that country’s electricity. Although Africans
desperately need cheap clean energy from these
renewable sources, their establishment has been
slow and underfunded compared to nonrenewable
resources, which are exportable and of greater interest
to overseas companies and governments that invest
in Africa’s infrastructure. Nonrenewable resources
include metallic and nonmetallic minerals and fossil
fuels. To be useful, natural resources must be accessible,
exploitable, and economically needed. Accessible
refers to the distribution and occurrence of a resource.
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Many African states have little or less-than-adequate
natural resources and cannot depend on this avenue
for development revenue. Exploitability requires
technology to recover and fashion these resources in
an economically viable way. Although some resources
are relatively easy to obtain, such as the alluvial
diamonds of Sierra Leone and Liberia (a characteristic
that fueled the civil wars in both countries), most need
capital, technology, and expertise, usually requiring
the intervention of foreign interests. Economic need
is based on the recognition that a resource has value
and fills a niche within an economy, generating trade
or industry. Natural resources can be more influential
in speeding development than agriculture because
the payoff is greater, but with increased risks. The
geographical distribution of natural resources give
them a value that rises and falls with international
demand, so thereby they may be unreliable sources
of funding for development plans. The requirement
for foreign demand and assistance to recover and use
these resources also means that a state government
often has less control over its fate than is true of more
localized agriculture. Because of the advanced level
of technology and expertise involved in extraction
activities, their potential return to spur development is
higher because of the capital cost and value added, but
usually rewards only an elite fraction of the population
unless government intervenes to spread the wealth.
Raw materials and agriculture alone can be used for
development, as coal and iron ore were used in the UK
to start the Industrial Revolution in the 18th century.
Other European countries, the United States, and Japan
followed suit with an increasing need for raw materials
to continue their development. This appetite, however,
resulted in imperialism in Africa and other parts of
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the world, thereby inhibiting further development
in the newly colonized regions.165 Natural resources
offer more potential to enhance development than
agriculture, if properly governed, but to a lesser extent
than industry or services. Below are examples of how
natural resources are contributing to development
of African nations and the pitfalls they pose to the
development process.
Natural resources in some countries have remained
the primary source for funding economic and human
development, resulting in both notable successes and
negative effects.166 From 2000 to 2007, oil exporting
countries led Africa’s economies with an impressive
7 percent growth rate.167 Gabon is a typical country
benefiting from this trend. Well into the 1970s,
Gabon was an exporter of timber, gold, iron ore, and
manganese, but the discovery of oil catapulted Gabon’s
growth. Oil, the commodity that accounts for 50 percent
of GDP and 80 percent of export revenues, caused the
GDP-PPP to rise to an impressive U.S. $13,800 in 2007.
Gabon’s national income per capita based on oil is near
the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa and is four times
that of most other African states.168 On the negative
side, Gabon’s rapid growth has also produced a high
income inequality level, which keeps power in a small
group and most of its population poor and uneducated.
Oil also dominates Nigeria’s economy at 25 percent of
GDP and 95 percent of exports. Although oil revenues
produced respectable growth from 1965 to 1982, the GNI
per capita since then has dropped from U.S. $1,110 to
$300 in 2000. This demonstrates the inherent transitory
nature of riches from natural commodities. The drop
in GNI was further exacerbated by the government’s
mismanagement of its economy, high population
growth (TFR of 5.41 in 2007), and ethnic divisions—
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typical of development problems confronted by other
African states.169
Not only has Nigeria’s oil production failed to
increase the general welfare of its people, but in some
cases it had a direct negative impact by harming
agriculture through polluting the land, and diverting
funds from agricultural development.170 In the oil
producing Niger River delta, the deprivations from
inequality and environmental degradation have ignited
an insurgency, which in turn disrupts oil production
and limits overall economic growth.171 Natural resource
wealth has stoked instability and violence in other
places, too. Impoverished Chad is currently hoping
for oil reserves to provide an economic boost through
foreign investment. However, internal ethnic unrest
and cross border incursions produced a negative 1.3
percent growth rate in 2007172 due in part to violent
disruption of oil production and mal-governance.173
Even where a government genuinely tries to develop
its population through its resources, it may not succeed.
Algeria earns 60 percent of its budget revenue and
95 percent of its export earnings from hydrocarbons
as the world’s 4th largest natural gas exporter and
14th in oil. Yet the government’s attempt to diversify
the economy so as to reduce high unemployment
and raise living standards has yet to be successful,
with reforms slowed by corruption and bureaucratic
inertia.174 The perceived blessings of oil may backfire
in other ways, too. Since the 1980s in the Republic of
Congo rising oil revenues have been the main source
to finance large-scale development resulting in a
substantial GDP growth averaging 5 percent annually.
To do so, however, the “government has mortgaged
a substantial portion of its oil earnings through oilbacked loans that have contributed to a growing debt

61

burden and chronic revenue shortfalls.”175 Congo’s
success is also threatened by the cyclical nature of oil
prices, internal instability, and incomplete government
and economic reform.176 The potential of African
natural resources have only been partially realized in
helping to advance the world’s least developed region.
Throughout Africa, the benefits of natural resources
are diminished because of many of the same recurring
problems found in agriculture: the cyclical nature of
the demand for natural resources, poor government
management in using the earnings from raw materials,
internal instability that actually may be caused by the
presence of such wealth, and population growth that
simply outstrips the economic growth rate. Despite
these hindrances, resource rich states are envied,
since many other African states are bereft of natural
resources and the potential of those resources to spur
development.
Natural resources can be both a help and hindrance
to development, so analyzing Africa’s sources of natural
wealth beyond hydrocarbons is instructive. Oil and
natural gas-poor African countries can sometimes rely
on other resources to generate foreign revenue. Guinea,
for example, is a major producer of bauxite and gem
stones that, along with other primary products, make
up 75 percent of its exports, but do not advance a low
HDI of 0.456, ranking 160th in the world.177 Zambia is
an important world supplier of cobalt and copper, a
major portion of its 91 percent of primary exports, but
has an even lower HDI of 0.434 and ranks 165th in the
world.178 The Democratic Republic of Congo is blessed
with 80 percent of the world’s cobalt reserves, 10 percent
of its copper, 30 percent of its diamonds, and other
diverse mining resources that contribute to 25 percent
of GDP output and 75 percent of total exports, along
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with rich renewable energy and agricultural sources.
Yet Congo has not realized its development potential
for many of the same reasons cited for other African
states: “government corruption, mismanagement, and
profligacy. . . . War only furthered the collapse.”179
South Africa is the continent’s largest and most diverse
source for important metallic and nonmetallic minerals.
These raw materials account for nearly all of South
Africa’s primary exports, which at only 48 percent of
all exports indicates a diversification of the economy
that few other countries in Africa share. South Africa
is a rare case where resources do not seem to hold
back economic and human development because of
the country’s relatively better governance, economic
management, greater stability, and diversification
into higher order economic activities. Morocco, on
the other hand, is not as well endowed with physical
resources, although it is the world’s leading exporter
of phosphates used in fertilizer, which make up 92
percent of its mining earnings.180 Together with some
food products, primary commodities only make up 35
percent of Morocco’s exports, but this contributes to a
higher HDI of 0.646, ranking 126th—very close to South
Africa’s level.181 Why is it that despite the abundant
natural resources found in Africa, only 3 of Africa’s 54
states (Seychelles, Mauritius, and Tunisia) rank in the
top 100 of the HDI,182 and none maintain this ranking
through agriculture or raw resources?
Despite its potential benefits, a case can be made
that reliance on Africa’s huge endowment of natural
resources is actually a detriment to development
because Africa’s wealth is so mismanaged as to retard
real growth elsewhere. Thomas Friedman, a noted
modern economics author, calls this the “curse of oil,”
but the curse could be extended to reliance on any
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natural resource sold as a state’s primary means of
revenue. Friedman explains:
As long as the monarchs and dictators who run these oil
states can get rich by drilling their natural resources—
as opposed to drilling the natural talents and energy of
their people—they can stay in office forever. They can
use oil money to monopolize all the instruments of power—army, police, and intelligence—and never have to
introduce real transparency or power sharing. . . . Countries focused on tapping their people have to focus on
developing real institutions, property rights, rule of law,
independent courts, modern education, foreign trade,
foreign investments, freedom of thought, and scientific
enquiry to get the most out of their men and women.183

Freidman’s comments describe a plutocracy that is
common in Africa, a self-serving elite whose grip on
power and wealth is simplified by the concentrated,
in-place, self-contained nature of mineral extraction
between a single foreign or local entity with capital
and expertise and a willing government that advances
the elites’ financial interests, and keeps the country
in a dependent relationship with international
institutions.184 An example is tolerating “piracy and
bunkering, or the theft of oil out of pipelines, [which]
are estimated to drain $1 billion to $4 billion annually
from West African oil production. An estimated
25 percent of Cameroon’s is stolen.”185 Worse is the
kleptocracy, where elites steal outright national wealth.
The books of Angola’s state oil company, Sonangol,
are treated as virtual state secrets. In 1998 more than
a billion dollars was secured for exploration permits
but “much of it disappeared off of the books.”186
Natural resource wealth has also literally fueled
violent conflict that so readily plagues the continent.
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The most notorious were blood diamonds smuggled out
by warring factions and sold on the world market to
finance war and insurgency. Africa’s bloodiest civil
war in the Democratic Republic of Congo was funded
through diamonds and its other resources.187 The
source of the natural wealth does not matter as much
as how that wealth is applied to achieve development,
or misapplied to prevent it. Unfortunately most
resources are squandered through lack of judicious
administration, meaning such natural wealth may be a
detriment under the wrong circumstances.
For all of their promise, the limitations of natural
resources in advancing development are widespread
and multifaceted. Some limits are due to the inherent
traits of natural resources, which concentrate their
wealth in only a few fortunate economies, and whose
price, and therefore aid to development, fluctuates
with an international market. The outside assistance
needed to generate supply and demand has opened
resource extraction to past colonial and alleged neocolonial relationships. Internal and external conflict
may be exacerbated by fighting over control of natural
resources, and ethnic divisions have also been factors in
diminishing the returns. However, the most significant
factor, and one over which Africans themselves hold
the most control, is that of mal-governance and poor
administration, which diverts the benefit of natural
resource revenue from developing economic and
human resources to ineffective schemes or outright
corruption. The proper administration of Africa’s
natural resources for the betterment of society is often
an unrealized dream. However, good administration
can promote economic and human prosperity as
states from Norway to Australia have demonstrated,
and of which Botswana is the best African example.
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The key to such success is the same as in successful
resource-poor countries such as Japan, Switzerland,
South Korea, Finland, and Taiwan—good governance
that invests in its people and a stable and secure
foundation to build upon. That is why gauging
social and economic measures is so important to
understanding development. Good economic planning
and the development of human capital are some of the
best ways to invest in the future, by harnessing natural
resources and talent and diversifying the economy into
higher order activities.
Industry.
If Africans wish to attain the same levels of
economic, social, and demographic development as
did Europe, North America, and Japan, they could
follow a similar path to advancement from primary
to secondary economic activities. These countries
showed that the most important component of the
economic development process is its people in terms
of numbers, literacy, health, and productivity. The
demographic characteristics of a country are a second
major component of the economic development
process, and one that is particularly suitable for aiding
development and building secondary economic
activities by some African countries. Secondary
economic activities are manufacturing, construction,
power production, and other activities “that process,
transform, and assemble raw materials into useful
products [or] take manufactured goods and fabricate
them into finished consumer products.”188 Industry
depends on the productivity of people, which is the
labor value-added to a product beyond the cost of
raw material and energy inputs.189 The productivity
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of people depends on their literacy, skills, and health
as enhanced by processes and capital inputs like tools,
transportation, and communications. The dividends
from value-added human intellect and fabrication using
capital and technology have been earlier demonstrated
in the higher returns from commercial agriculture
over subsistence. People are key components of both
farming and industry. However, with farming the
population is relatively dispersed while in industry
workers are usually concentrated in cities or their
surroundings, which results in an economy of scale
in production, concentration of support facilities like
transportation and communication nodes, and more
efficient consumption of products produced. Although
the mining and drilling of resources are considered
primary economic activities, extraction shares many
characteristics with industry so they are sometimes
analyzed together, as with the data used in Table 8.
The similarities between extraction and manufacturing
are that both operate from point locations, involve
higher level worker skills and technology, require
expensive capital infrastructure investments and access
to power, and offer higher economic returns. Because
of the economic advantages that secondary activities
provide, “one of the markers of underdevelopment
today is the relative absence of modern manufacturing
capability.”190 In Sub-Saharan Africa, industry has
fared poorly, declining in relative world share since
1975 from 4.8 percent to 2.4 percent in 1990.191 In 2006,
according to Director General Kandeh Yumkella of
the UN Industrial Development Organization, SubSaharan Africa’s share of world industrial output stands
at 1 percent, and half of that comes from South Africa.
In contrast, South Korea alone produces 3.4 percent
of the world’s industrial output.192 Clearly, industry
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has played a much smaller role in Africa’s economies
than agriculture or resource extraction. Industry has
remained stagnant in absolute terms and declined in
relative terms over the past decades. If African societies
wish to develop further, then industrialization is one
path to follow, as has already occurred in developed
states.
All African states have some light manufacturing
tailored to domestic markets, which may range from a
village blacksmith to a small local bottling plant. It is at
the intraregional and international levels that African
manufacturing remains paltry and uncompetitive.
However, Africans do possess some comparative
advantages for their own development through
industries in which native components are significant.
Most major industrial areas in Africa are centered in
urban areas near natural resources such as West Africa’s
petroleum fields, Southwest Africa’s ring of diamonds,
South Africa’s mineral rich Witwatersrand, copper in
Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and
the agricultural regions of Lake Victoria and central
Ethiopia.193 Dependence on primary goods is common
in the early stages of industrialization because it
builds upon existing economic specialization. For
example, Ethiopia’s small industrial sector depends
upon agriculture to produce textiles from its cotton
crop, and leather goods from its cattle herds.194 Such
agriculturally-based manufacturing accounts for 66
percent of Ethiopia’s manufacturing base, 73 percent
in Uganda, and 90 percent in Burundi.195 These efforts
are only a small first step, however. Botswana, on the
other hand, has been remarkably successful in using
its main natural resource, diamonds, to attain one of
the world’s highest sustained economic growth rates.
Stability, security, and good governance are major
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contributors to this success, but they have also benefited
from higher level activities, going beyond being the
world’s largest producer of crude diamonds.196 To
gain the economic benefits of value-added human
fabrication, the government insisted that its partner,
the giant diamond company DeBeers, move its sorting
operations from London and its cutting, polishing, and
marketing operations from India to Botswana.197 This
lucrative arrangement has maintained one of Africa’s
highest GDPs per capita—shared by a small population
composed mostly of subsistence farmers.
South Africa, the continent’s economic powerhouse,
has an industrial base founded on natural resources
and local requirements. However, a well-developed
infrastructure in communications, transportation and
energy, a strong business services sector, and relative
stability have allowed diverse industries producing
automobiles, metalwork, machinery, textiles, iron
and steel, and chemicals to develop within South
Africa.198 Yet despite these advantages, South Africa’s
manufacturing remains as stagnant as that of the
rest of Africa.199 Mauritius’ industry also started
with a basic commodity, sugar, but the government
aggressively diversified it to achieve a middle income
economy. In the 1960s, raw sugar accounted for 86
percent of export earnings because it is the island’s
only viable commercial crop. Since then, Mauritius has
expanded to processing molasses, and more recently
to producing bio-fuel from sugar waste to generate
60 percent of the country’s electricity. Mauritius has
purposely grown beyond its natural resources to enter
into the labor intensive textile industry as a way to
continue to advance its economy further. At its peak
in 2004, such light manufacturing accounted for 21.4
percent of GDP, almost all for export.200 To become
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internationally competitive, the government of
Mauritius heavily invested in its human potential and
physical infrastructure, and is showing the benefits in
its favorable development measurements, including
an equitable income distribution.201 Industry based on
using native natural resources is a basic stepping stone
towards development, but because Mauritius is resource poor, it has purposefully enabled and harnessed its
human resources. Nearly all countries in Africa have
started down the industrialization path, except for
South Africa and Mauritius, few have gone far. The
fundamentals of stability, good government planning,
and proper investment once again demonstrate their
value for economic and social development. However,
even with the achievement of some successes, Africa’s
most advanced countries face problems in sustaining
their development and maintaining their relatively
high standards of living.
Despite the previous examples, Africa cannot be
construed as an industrialized region. Even with a few
bright examples, African economies must surmount
daunting intrastate and interstate obstacles to grow
their industrial bases so as to become competitive.
Continuing to examine Mauritius’ manufacturing
illustrates some of the problems that African states face.
The industrial gains made by Mauritius through the
harnessing of its one agricultural asset, sugar, and the
textile skills of its people were challenged by changes
to international trade policy. In 2005, the EU started
to remove preferential trade agreements in sugar
given to former colonial states (Mauritius was a British
possession until 1968). This has severely strained sugar
farming and its attendant industries, the island’s most
important employer and revenue source. To remain
competitive, seven of eleven sugar processing plants
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Country

Employment
In industry
(% employ)

GDP from
Industry
(% of
total)

Industrial
Exports

Employment
in Services
(% employ)

GDP
from
Services
(% of
total)

Intrnat’l
Tourists
(000s)

Algeria

23

61

Petroleum
products

63

30

866

Botswana

n/a

51

Textiles

n/a

47

843

8
(approx)

47

None

12
(approx)

31

44

n/a

57

Plywood

n/a

37

26

8

13

Leather
products

12

38

125

Ghana

15

25

Aluminum

29

38

373

Kenya

10
(approx)

17

Petroleum
products

15
(approx)

59

990

Mauritius

30

25

Clothing,
molasses

61

70

n/a

Nigeria

10

53

Petroleum
products

20

29

813

Sierra
Leone
n/a

31

None

n/a

20

South
Africa

26

27

Machinery

65

71

6,026

Sudan

7

36

Petroleum
products

13

33

39

UK

18

24

81

75

4900

USA

23

21

76

78

52,690

Chad
Congo,
Rep
Ethiopia

10

Notes: Data from 2007. Tourism data from 2000, except Botswana and South Africa from 1999.
Employment in Industry and GDP from Industry percentage includes mining and drilling.
Sources: CIA’s 2008 World Factbook, 2007 data. Tourism: Tom Nevin, “African Tourism Review,”
African Business, February 2003, except U.S. and UK from World Tourism Organization Release
“Millennium Tourism Boom in 2000.”

Table 8. Comparison of Industry and Services
Employment and Production Indicators.
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closed, farming practices were modernized, and alternate derivative products were developed. These were
strong government responses to adverse circumstances. A second blow also ended favorable U.S.
and European textile import quotas, which had
successfully stimulated industry in the world’s
poorest countries. These changes closed hundreds
of factories in Mauritius, which at the time was the
world’s second largest exporter of woolen knits.202
Lesotho’s burgeoning textile industry suffered the
same fate in 2005. Under the U.S. African Growth and
Opportunity Act (AGOA), passed in 2000, African
development was promoted through increased
trade and investment.203 East Asian manufacturers
took advantage of cheap African labor and reduced
U.S. duties to invest U.S. $100 million in Lesotho,
employing 50,000 people and producing 10.5 percent
of its GDP. The end of preferential imports brought
the near overnight collapse of this industry in Lesotho
and other African countries.204 There are international
trade obstacles preventing development other than
trade barriers. For example, Africa’s young industries
lack the fundamentals to gain entry into developed
markets; the same quality, safety, marketing, and other
problems that African agricultural produce also faces.
International standards are higher and more ubiquitous
than in decades past, and integrating into multilateral
trading systems like the World Trade Organization
(WTO) is more difficult.205 Thus African industry needs
to improve its production capacity, but its efforts are
undercut by an inability to attract foreign capital and
expertise, and by international trade regulations.
In many cases Africans and their governments have
also undermined their own industrial development.
Zimbabwe once boasted one of Africa’s more diverse
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economies and modern industrial sectors. It successfully
exported textiles, footwear, and agricultural machinery
to regional markets. However, inept management,
corruption, and a draconian one-party state polarized
society and eviscerated an industrial success story.206
Violence and instability are perhaps the biggest causes
of underdevelopment in Africa because it frightens
away capital investment and investors who seek
stability to reap a return. Even after investments are
made, stability is needed to operate, as the Democratic
Republic of Congo illustrates with its long-running
internal conflict contributing to an industrial capacity
producing at just 25 percent and unemployment at 85
percent in 2005.207 Lack of infrastructure investment is
another chronic problem for industrialization. A U.S.
$1.2 billion mega aluminum smelter was located in
Mozambique to take advantage of cheap hydro-electric
potential from the Zambezi River. However, the
finished plant will consume four times Mozambique’s
average electricity production and requires major
investment in additional dams and in Mozambique’s
fledgling natural gas industry for more energy. The
project is stalled after its first phase until more power
is generated. However, needed investment is arriving
from foreign investors impressed with the government’s
open economic regime and capitalist development,
which has made Mozambique one of the most dynamic
economies in Africa.208 Mozambique is benefiting from
its government’s policies, but many states do not, and
poor governance and administration may be the second
biggest cause for lack of development. A disappointing
example is Ethiopia where private land ownership is
illegal, hampering investment in industry such that
only a small portion of Ethiopia’s economic production
is manufactured.209 Governments such as the ones in
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Nigeria or Cameroon also misallocate public funds,
undercutting important sectors like agriculture by
investing in the more glamorous extraction industry.210
Sometimes these misallocations “stimulated ruralurban migration, yet there were insufficient jobs
to absorb those who left the countryside,” and the
misallocation was also a cause for food shortages on the
continent.211 Government imposed import substitution
strategies strive to build young native industries by
protecting them in their local market from foreign
competition. Inevitably, though, such policies produce
inefficient low quality companies, whose products are
globally uncompetitive and too expensive for local
consumers. African government efforts are better
spent making their industries competitive through
establishing “institutions for industrial standards,
testing, expert support, quality assurance, training,
technology information, research, and technical
extension and assistance for investors, suppliers,
subcontractors, and local African entrepreneurs.”212
Neo-liberal trade policies, such as the “Washington
Consensus,” advocate an export-led development
strategy that would open up African economies to
world trade starting with African agricultural and
extractive products. This might reverse Africa’s
declining share of world trade, which now stands at
only 1.5 percent.213 In 2001, Afrobarometer cited several
African countries for their positive market reforms and
democratization including Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho,
Malawi, Mali, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania,
Uganda, and Zambia.214 If their efforts continue, these
are the countries that have positioned themselves
for success through their internal efforts, adapting to
international markets and using international support
to lead African economies past old negative tendencies
and toward sustainable development.
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Services.
A third part of an economy is its tertiary economic
activities, its services. These complement and enhance
the primary and secondary activities and add vigor
to an economy through diversity and greater depth.
Services are any activity that fulfills a human want or
need and returns money to those who provide it. There
are three types of services with numerous subtypes that
include consumer services such as retail and wholesale,
education, health, leisure and hospitality; business
services such as financial, professional, transportation,
and communications; and public services like security
and social services.215
As with primary and secondary economic activities,
tertiary activities rely on the economic development
components of people, the natural environment,
and societal culture. Whereas the success of primary
activities was particularly sensitive to the natural
environment, and secondary activities to the quality
of a population, tertiary activities are especially
dependent on culture. Culture is the way that a society
“organizes itself in terms of beliefs, values, customs
and lifestyles [which] greatly influences both the
direction and degree of development.”216 When service
activities are used to generate international revenue,
the manner in which a culture embraces change and
globalization is a key to success. Like industry, the
added-value of people’s involvement and investment
required for many tertiary activities give these higher
order economic endeavors greater returns.
The human-to-human aspect of services that provide
international revenue puts a premium on the culture
component of development in order to sufficiently

75

interact with other societies and embrace the constant
fast-paced changes that globalization requires. Some
examples of cultural characteristics are typical personalsocietal obligation traits that could impact the success
of international services through the concept of time
(Western economies are monochronic, being more
schedule driven than polychronic societies, as typically
found in Africa), attitude towards uncertainty (Western
economies are more accepting of uncertainty and risk
than uncertainty avoidance cultures), and acceptance
of authority (participation in Western economies is
more flat and distributed than in high power distance
cultures).217
The service sector of most African economies is
composed primarily of internal personal services
ranging from retail vendors to primary schools to cell
phone providers. At some level, services have existed
throughout Africa’s history alongside agriculture
and basic industries. African tertiary activities can
include high technology and support other parts of
the economy at the same time. One prime example is
the research conducted by African universities to find
better adapted crops and techniques to spur subsistence
and commercial agriculture. Other examples of service
support to African activities include banking and
insurance to cover factories and mines and public
transportation and security to help bring crops to
market. Although all African countries have some
services, the strongest and largest economies have
broadened themselves to offer international services.
Among several such African activities, tourism and
intraregional business services are two of the more
important that will be presented here as examples.
Even though they constitute only a small part of the
overall economy, expanding global tertiary activities
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should be a goal for Africans, since these activities tend
to use higher order human skills, are more lucrative,
and are a catalyst to higher economic and human
development. They have also been the best method of
development for countries like Singapore, which are
resource poor but invest heavily in the skills and wellbeing of their people.
One natural resource for which Africa is renowned
but is not mined or drilled is its inspiring landscape and
abundant wildlife, from the tropical rain forests to the
vast grass savannas. In 2001 28.4 million international
tourists visited these sights, generating U.S. $11.7
billion in much needed foreign income for Africa. Many
countries see tourism as vital in generating revenue
for economic development. Tourism can be a boon to
job creation, attract foreign expertise to develop local
skills, balance intrastate development, and diversify
an economy. Since Africa is the destination of choice
for only 4.1 percent of international tourists worldwide, there is much growth potential in this sector.218
One Zambian businessman summed up the promise
and challenges of tourism when he said, “Virtually
Africa-wide, the tourism industry has been identified
as the sector most likely to build national economies.
The painful question is how to stimulate the political
will, persuade governments and private sectors to
fund tourism infrastructure . . . and, probably most
importantly, for governments to inspire the confidence
of foreign investors.”219 Some African countries have
answered these questions and succeeded in attracting
tourists, especially Kenya in the east; Mauritius and the
Seychelles on the Indian Ocean; Morocco, Tunisia, and
Egypt in the north; Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal in the
west; and South Africa. Some of this success is a result
of scenic natural resources and climate—advantageous
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but not equitably distributed elements of tourism.
Another geographic advantage is close proximity
to Europe, which helped North Africa attract over a
third of Africa’s tourists (10.6 million) and receipts
(U.S. $4.2 billion) in 2001.220 A third important factor
is stability and security. Quite simply, tourists are
attracted to safe and secure areas for vacation, and
investors look for macroeconomic stability to realize
a return in infrastructure investments like lodging,
transportation, and attractions. Zimbabwe is a case in
point. It slipped from 1.2 million visitors in 1999 to a few
thousand in 2002 because of the political and economic
problems that threaten violence in that country.
The expectation of stability in the rest of southern
Africa plays an important part in the World Tourism
Organization predictions that this region will become
Africa’s top tourist destination by 2020 with 36 million
visitors, nearly quadruple the number it had in 2000.221
Tourism also tends to succeed in countries where other
foreign enterprises already exist with functioning
investment ties, open channels of communication,
and good understanding of foreign cultures222—
meaning established integration into the international
community, or continuing dependence through neocolonialism, depending on one’s perspective. Kenya
is an example of these conditions where “pioneer
facilities development was in place because Kenya
had a vigorous expatriate community which sought
to advance foreign commercial interests, including
tourism.” Not coincidentally, East Africa was the third
most visited African region with 5.9 million visitors in
2001, and expected to grow proportionately through
2020.223 By establishing good economic fundamentals of
a stable environment and global connections, Africa’s
tourism can greatly boost the continent’s development
aspirations.
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As with other endeavors, good governance and
political will are also required to attain the stability
and globalization needed to thrive in international
tourism, but also to support human development in
terms of health and education, legal rights for private
enterprise and political freedoms, and the construction
and maintenance of a basic physical infrastructure.
Such good governance also enhances other economic
endeavors but is particularly important to activities like
tourism that have a strong international component.
The Seychelles is a model for applying these criteria
towards tourism, having hosted 140,000 elite tourists
in 2006 accounting for 70 percent of its foreign
earnings and an impressive GDP per capita. Most
African countries have been unable to establish such
criteria and, as a consequence, have not built higher
end activities like tourism. Establishing tourism in an
environmentally sustainable way is another form of
good governance and critically important to maintain
the assets that tourists seek.224 Sustainability is also
attained through building native human resources to
develop quality services and to encourage skills that
could improve other economic sectors as well.225 Even
if all of these conditions are properly set, unexpected
events such as terrorism may undercut any efforts,
which is why diversity of activities in an economy is
important. For example, Morocco registered decreases
in its important tourism businesses after the attacks of
September 2001, and even more after the U.S. invasion
of Iraq in 2003.226 In Tanzania, tourism has dropped
significantly following the al-Qaeda attack on the U.S.
embassy in 1998 and with the subsequent rise in Islamist
moralism.227 Although often seen as a main engine for
development in Africa, the broad requirements for
natural or cultural attractions—human development
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skills, cultural sensibilities and globalization, stability,
and good governance—have set a high bar for entry
into tourist services. Much like mineral extraction
and manufacturing, tourism can also disturb fragile
balances in local societies, infrastructure, and the
environment. However, those countries that succeed
in tourism experience a synergistic effect that improves
other economic sectors. For these reasons, rather than
being the engine of African-wide development, tourism
may reinforce the gulf between developing and poor
countries228 and for most countries may simply be a
mark of development rather than a way to reach it.
Often, countries that are sophisticated enough to
establish a tertiary sector like international tourism
also possess the skills and resources to diversify into
other higher service activities as well. Higher level
services include the banking, insurance, brokering,
and other services commonly grouped under the
financial sector of business services. A strong financial
services sector is particularly prized in an economy
because it is not only a lucrative sector in its own
right, but one that can financially support and boost
other economic activities from agriculture to services.
In the weak financial markets often found in Africa,
a strong indigenous financial sector can fill a void to
become a regional hub gaining foreign revenue and
attracting international expertise for local companies
and their workers. However, doing so usually requires
liberalizing the local economy and removing barriers.
Although it is considered risky to open an economy to
global competition, the advantages are a larger potential market and the effort of compelling native
businesses to sharpen their skills, broaden services
and products, and lower costs to other businesses.
Becoming a competitive regional financial hub also
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requires sophisticated communications, transportation,
research, and managerial skills and infrastructure
bolstering those and other sectors as well.229 Mauritius
has deliberately expanded its economy beyond
sugar, textiles, and tourism to embrace banking,
communications, and information technology by
creating cyber cities, and tapping into the fiber-optic
cable that runs from Europe to India’s “high-tech”
corridor.230 In so doing, it has become a regional
financial hub, luring over 32,000 off-shore entities
worth U.S. $1 billion to transact business in India,
China, and Africa.231 Mauritius also benefits from its
predominately Indian culture to serve as go-between
for businesses in India and the rest of the world.
To bridge the shortage in needed skilled workers,
Mauritius has invested heavily in education, extended
the school day, and added technological subjects to its
curriculum, but a lack of qualified people remains its
biggest impediment to growth.232 South Africa has built
a well-regulated and sophisticated financial sector that
attracts many foreign financial businesses to the region
because its technology, infrastructure, and supervision
meet competitive world standards.233 Because of these
standards, South Africa’s stock exchange has grown to
become the 17th largest in the world and now includes
many foreign brokerages that control up to 40 percent
of the market; yet the bourse’s overall size grew so
much that few of the local traders lost revenue.234 South
Africa is the continent’s leader in commercial loans,
financial advisory services, foreign exchange, securities
trading, and insurance; all of which make South
Africa an important launching point into Africa for
international business.235 In 2003, South Africa also had
38,000 people working in call centers, taking advantage
of its communications infrastructure and human skills.
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Ghana, Senegal, Kenya, Morocco, and Madagascar
have also started international call center operations,
but have only 16,000 jobs among them.236 Striving to
become a services’ hub requires liberalizing economic
policies and investing in requisite infrastructure and
people skills in order to take advantage of regional
financial services.
Not all international financial dealings are by large
transnational corporations. Because of Africa’s maldistribution of resources, wealth, and opportunities,
many workers are migrant, sending remittances to
their families at home. Lesotho, for instance, has few
resources, so many of its 50 percent unemployed go
to South Africa to work. Although declining, in 1996
remittances still accounted for a third of the entire
GDP of Lesotho.237 Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria,
and overseas countries like Spain, Great Britain, and
France host many African workers who need to send
money home. Kenya is the regional hub in East Africa
for financial services, dealing in both large commercial
and small micro-fund transfers.238 Kenya’s claim as
the regional hub comes from its relative strength in
regulation and better coverage in terms of numbers
of banks and population served—even though its
financial services do not reach global standards.239 The
small and informal nature of such exchanges makes
tracking them difficult, but they remain major sources
of income and part of Kenya’s strength as a financial
hub. As desirable as financial and other services may
be as part of an economy, the high cost of capital to
develop the infrastructure and human skills needed to
participate has severely limited or barred most African
states from benefiting.240 An ironic twist for African
states is that international banking is mature enough to
be used in a reverse transfer of wealth because African

82

states must repay huge debts they incurred—U.S.
$15 billion for interest alone in 2003.241 International
debt relief as pioneered by the British government at
the G8 Gleneagles conference in 2005 has started a
welcome trend of debt reduction for 38 countries, most
of them African, based on demonstrated improved
governance.242 These actions should help right financial
systems, lower balance of payments, and divert debt
payments into a states’ physical and human capital.
Debt relief and the reward of good governance are
welcome steps in reinforcing basic requirements for
development: stability, government transparency,
liberalizing economies, and investment in human and
physical capital. In banking, as in most of the other
international services, Africans are woefully deficient—
both a cause and an indicator of their underdeveloped
status.
Africa’s Economy Summary.
Although often described and perceived as a single
entity, Africa’s people and economies are no monolith.
Africa presents a complex environment with many
factors affecting its diverse parts. Africa boasts some
success stories, along with the world’s most destitute
people and conditions. Almost half of Sub-Saharan
African states averaged an economic growth rate of 5
percent or more in 2003, and over a third in 2006, with
16 countries sustaining growth of over 4 percent for a
decade. Although Sub-Saharan economies have grown
by over 4.5 percent from 2000 to 2007, the growth rate
did not keep pace with the higher average of other
underdeveloped countries, but did beat the world
average and, most important for real gains, exceeded
the population growth rate.243 Despite recent relative
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success, Africa’s 54 states still occupy 26 of the world’s
bottom 32 rankings in GDP-PPP per capita (with
Malawi at the bottom), 28 of the lowest 36 in literacy
rates (with Burkina Faso the lowest), 35 of the lowest
37 states in life expectancy (Zambia being the worst),
and 34 of the last 40 counties in the HDI (with Sierra
Leone bringing up the rear, but Liberia and Somalia
did not report and may be in worse shape).244 What
caused these differences? The problems bringing about
such poverty are many, as discussed in the preceding
sections. Economic reasons include low human
labor value added in most African activities, low or
fluctuating commodity prices, lack of investment
in physical infrastructure and human capital, overreliance on one primary economic product for foreign
revenue, difficulty in meeting world standards in
products and globalization requirements, dependence
on one or a few international markets in which to sell
goods, state domination of the economy, poor corporate
administration and oversight, and import price shocks.
Political problems include lack of stability or violence
through frequent coups, civil wars and cross-border
fighting, dominance of self-serving elites, inadequate
citizen representation, and poor or counterproductive
government policies. These factors undermine the
security and stability that African states require if they
are to continue to develop economically and mature
politically. These are the goals for which Africans, and
those external bodies like USAFRICOM that intend
to meaningfully help Africans, must strive to achieve
if real and enduring progress is to be made towards
peace, security, and stability in Africa.
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ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The situation in Africa is bleak and has been for
decades. Other developing regions have far surpassed
it in social, economic, and political measurements of
development and governance, which remain stubbornly stalled in Africa. Africans, as well as the rest of
the world community, need peace and prosperity on the
continent to benefit its people, attain mutual security
and humanitarian aspirations, and incorporate Africa
into the world’s economy. Foreign assistance, including
military support like that represented by USAFRICOM,
can be of great help toward the achievement of these
goals. Such support can assist with much needed
security and stability by performing an external
security role, and to a lesser extent, in establishing
and maintaining internal law, order, and justice. These
are traditional missions of military peace operations
that are well understood and are internationally
sanctioned. The military’s role in the equally important
requirements for economic development and better
governance has precedents from humanitarian relief to
security assistance and stability operations. However,
the involvement of a military force in these endeavors
may be more controversial, misunderstood, or
misapplied. The previous discussion of how Africa’s
importance warrants international assistance, the
precedent for military involvement in establishing
security and stability, and the need to address
economic development and political governance were
presented as background information in order to
better examine possible foreign government actions
to improve the conditions in Africa. This next section
elaborates on a continuum of actions to better organize
and administer assistance in order to illuminate what
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has been accomplished in terms of the status quo and
what improvement can be made to current models.
The upcoming section also discusses what could be
done with greater direct military involvement and
leadership, or with military support given under the
close direction of other government agencies. This
discussion will enable the reader to decide how foreign
government assistance can be used to help Africans
achieve peace and prosperity.
The past use of aid has proven that external help
alone will not solve Africa’s problems. Africans need
to fix their own problems. However, these problems
are of such magnitude that leaving them strictly for
Africans to solve will take a very long time to succeed.
Outside help is still needed, but not of the type given
in the past. Since independence, African states have
absorbed a net total of $600 billion in foreign aid with
disappointing results—confirming that the current
efforts by Africans and the international community
to improve the situation are insufficient.245 During the
Cold War, foreign aid was often misdirected simply
to win political support.246 Such engagement was the
antithesis of good governance or proper economic
development and as a result, many Africans “lost
faith in the various projects of modernization and
development that promised Africans a better life,”
with ramifications still echoing today.247 Corruption,
instability, and underdeveloped infrastructure and
human resources have discouraged most international
business investment, leaving 70 percent of gross capital
formation in Africa stemming from donor country
hand-outs and less than 15 percent from foreign
investment. The little foreign business investment
available is usually cordoned in enclaves of natural
resources that are buffered from local economies to
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limit exposure to crime and conflict.248 Africans have
grown reliant on outside aid rather than solving their
own problems, and may now be trapped in the paradox
of needing aid to grow more self-reliant. However it
is delivered, aid to Africans should be given so as to
build African economic and governing capacity while
reducing their need for such aid, the dependency on
which has historically slowed African progress.
Keep What Works.
Security trumps everything. It does little good to build a
school if parents are afraid to send their children to that
school because they may not come home.
James Stephenson
in Losing the Golden Hour249

Security and stability are prerequisites for any
improvements in Africa, so attaining them should
be the first step for indigenous and international
policymakers and planners. This is also certainly the
desire of the local populace for whom relative safety
in conducting daily affairs is of great concern.250 The
creation of a benign environment also benefits the
population through the safe introduction of the services
of crucial civilian government agencies and intergovernment and nongovernment organizations, and
the more effective use of available military support.251
Such was the case by 1952 in occupied Japan where
“without a secure environment in which to operate,
the likelihood of SCAP [Supreme Commander of the
Allied Powers] successfully guiding the Japanese
Government to political and economic reform was slim
at best.”252 Where conditions have deteriorated beyond
the ability of local government, law enforcement,
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and military forces to provide a stable and secure
environment, foreign military forces could employ
their inherent capabilities to restore these necessary
conditions.253 The type of military actions needed to
do so depends on the nature of the threats faced and
how advanced the stability and security efforts are.
Sometimes coercive military actions are needed to
counter political and criminal threats and violence,
as international forces tried to do in Somalia in the
1990s. Under other circumstances, a military force
may act simply as a deterrent and require no direct
intervention at all.254 Between these two, FM 3-07
suggests that military forces can transform conflict,
“the process of reducing the means and motivations
for violent conflict while developing more viable,
peaceful alternatives for the competitive pursuit of
political and socioeconomic aspirations,” and address
the causes of strife.255 Although a less traditional
form of military intervention, conflict transformation
could convert disruptive actions into economic and
political improvements. Thomas Barnett also believes
that economic and political progress depend upon
the elimination of conflict and that military forces
are an important way to achieve peace. In this vein,
he asserts that security is the “most influential [U.S.]
public-sector export.”256 On a national interest level, a
U.S. security umbrella over Africa also protects U.S.
investments and resources and opens Africa to benefit
from international investment, expertise, and trade.257
According to FM 3-07, attaining security and stability
are part of the primary stability tasks assigned to U.S.
military forces when, under some circumstances,
military forces must be part of the solution overseas.
Conflict resolution through hard power may be
what most military forces train for and do best, but

88

they may also deliver security and stability through
less lethal soft power methods, such as the U.S.
Department of Defense (DoD) concept of peacetime
military engagement. Such engagement comes from
USAFRICOM and other U.S. combatant command
theater security cooperation programs, “which share
many of the same broad goals as stability operations
. . . to build partner capacity, strengthen legitimate
governance, maintain rule of law, [and] foster economic
growth. . . .”258 Security engagement recognizes that
security and stability are vital to both U.S. and host
country interests, but should be attained through
cooperative improvement to local conditions with U.S.
forces rather than more drastic direct intervention.
This is what USAFRICOM’s commander calls “active
security—defined as a persistent and sustained level
of effort focused on security assistance programs
that prevent conflict in order to foster dialogue and
development.”259 Here the AFRICOM Commander
refers to security assistance: the best known of many
types of security cooperation, which supplies defenserelated articles, training, and services to another
country.260 However, security assistance is only one of
many defense programs supplied by the U.S. military
through U.S. ambassadors to shore up similar values and
interests between the United States and host countries
while achieving common goals.261 FM 3-07 also notes
that “the most effective measure for conflict prevention
and resolution is the promotion of democracy and
economic development . . . [and] Stability tasks executed
as part of a theater security cooperation plan under the
operational theme of peacetime military engagement
generally fall in this category.”262 Peacetime military
engagement consists of many programs to deliver these
results. The following paragraphs give three examples
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of such assistance to put into context how they are used
in Africa: professionalization activities like combined
education, training, and exercises; humanitarian
assistance; and broader nation assistance activities.
Security engagement is an important contribution to
the security and stability of far more countries than
that of direct hard power, and will remain a part of
any potential solutions that military forces are called
upon to support.
Since combined education, training, and exercises
are highly visible and well established within the U.S.
military, they should constitute part of any solution
involving government-to-government assistance.
An example in education is USAFRICOM’s African
Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) which offers
informative seminars to senior military and civilian
African leaders to provide institutional and individual
understanding about military forces operating under
democratic institutions. The British, French, and other
governments run similar educational partnerships to
build a military capability for professional, competent
African leaders.263 At lower leadership levels, from
2002 to 2005 U.S. military programs provided training
to approximately 2,000 Africans annually in a variety
of undertakings covering 47 African countries at a cost
of U.S. $250.6 million.264 Examples of bilateral activities
include U.S. marines training Algerians on patrolling
techniques;265 U.S. airmen in Botswana teaching
airlift, security, and logistics;266 and $500 million for
internal security training through the Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Initiative to increase border security
and counterterrorism capability.267 Because of their
bilateral worth, other developed countries also offer
such programs, such as the British Military Advisory
and Training Teams (BMATT) and French Renforcement
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des Capacités Africaines de Maintien la Paix (RECAMP),
each also emphasizing the “train-the-trainer” concept
and sustained engagement.268 Such professionalization
of national forces in Africa counters the coup d’etat and
factional fighting by armed forces that have been major
sources of instability in African states.
One particularly successful U.S. training program
that instills discipline and basic military skills in African forces, while also directly contributing to continentwide peace and stability, is the Africa Contingency
Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA). Initially
conceived as the African Crisis Response Initiative
(ACRI) after the Somalia and Rwanda debacles,
ACOTA seeks to strengthen African peacekeeping and humanitarian response capabilities while resolving Africa’s problems internally.269 This arrangement has reduced direct U.S. participation in African
peacekeeping operations (PKO) by replacing it with
improved African peacekeeping forces. Since ACRI’s
inception in 1997, the program has trained 45,000
African troops and 3,200 trainers from 21 participating
countries at a rate of 21 battalions a year,270 with
four of the 10 top UN contributing countries in 2006
coming from Africa (Nigeria, Ghana, Ethiopia, and
Kenya).271 This leaves the U.S. military to directly
support African PKO with specialized services in short
supply, like logistics, airlift, communications, and fire
support.272 For example, in 2009 USAFRICOM began
large scale support to peace operations for African
troops in Darfur by airlifting Rwandan troops and
equipment.273 The immediate benefit of ACOTA is to
apply an African solution to African problems. Of more
long-term importance is that peacekeeping missions
“provide the lion’s share of operational experience for
a growing proportion of African professional military
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leaders at every level . . . shifting their operational
context from post-colonial regime maintenance, traditional war fighting, and the struggle for black
majority rule, to peace operations.”274 ACOTA offers
an example of building military capacity in African
states; partnership with outside powers to meet
mutual needs and to attain international standards in
operations; and perseverance to institutionalize this
program and its values—which are also hallmarks of
other U.S. and foreign education, training, and exercise
plans. Such programs develop African military forces
to contribute more to internal security and stability
on the continent and instill a sense of transparent
responsibility and respect for civil authorities, rule
of law, and international human rights— “part of
broader trends toward more representative and
more accountable governance in Africa.”275 Roles in
soft power represented by education, training, and
exercises are traditional military missions supporting
other forces, and directly strengthen the stability and
security for which military forces should exist.
Education, training, and exercises, however, do
not adequately confront the underlying problems
of economic development and good governance,
although both stability operations and theater
security engagement give U.S. military forces a role
in addressing both. Other forms of military activities
are closer to the mark of addressing humanitarian
problems including Humanitarian and Civic Assistance
(HCA). This assistance benefits the local populace as
secondary activities of planned military operations or
exercises. HCA serves to address basic human needs
like medical, dental, or veterinary care; drilling wells
or constructing sanitation facilities; and constructing
or repairing roads and public facilities like schools and
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clinics276 for the society within which U.S. forces are
operating. During a training exercise in Ghana and
Togo for example, U.S. sailors treated thousands of local
people with critically needed medical care. Another
U.S. Navy example involved a construction battalion
(Seabees) deployed to Liberia in 2008 that renovated two
medical clinics and a large high school with electricity,
running water, and structural improvements.277 Such
actions benefit the population with services they
otherwise would not have received, improve the
operational readiness of the military participants,
and the U.S. Government members garner improved
contacts, cultural understanding, and good will.278 A
similar program run by UN forces also strives to have
a good effect while supporting other operational goals.
A Quick Impact Project (QIP) is meant to assist a local
population in a number of ways during a peacekeeping
mission to include infrastructure improvement and
income generating activities.279 International programs
like HCA and QIP help the impoverished with basic
medical care, infrastructure improvement, and
economic support in which Africa is woefully deficient,
but they do not significantly contribute to systemic
economic development on the level that African states
need. Although such humanitarian programs are
usually conducted in partnership with Africans, their
immediate nature usually means that they are done for
Africans by outsiders and therefore do not build crucial
capacity whereby Africans learn to help themselves.
These programs also lack persistence, often meeting
an urgent need, but in a piecemeal way. For this
reason, the UN warns that QIPs “are not a substitute
for humanitarian and/or development assistance,”
since their real purpose is to build respect for the UN
mission and confidence in the peace process.280 For
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the United States, HCA benefits are acknowledged
as residual, with their primary purpose being to
influence and gain access for U.S. personnel. Only two
of five HCA program objectives directly support local
interests.281 USAFRICOM’s budget for HCA activity
is very small and constrained, severely limiting its
impact on development.282 The tie between HCA and
development problems in Africa is obvious, and HCA
is one way to improve distressing situations. However,
such programs’ transitory and by-product nature lack
perseverance and in-depth capacity building and are
akin to previous less-effective methods that do not
systemically address the root cause of problems in
Africa. Although accomplishing some good locally
while meeting foreign interests, such programs fall
short in terms of the economic development and good
governance that Africans need.
Although each part of theater security engagement
may contribute in part or indirectly to economic
development or good governance, nation assistance
operations can allow military forces to address economic development and governance issues more
broadly. In peacetime through war, nation assistance
supports another country with “sustainable development and growth . . . to promote long term regional
stability” under the direction of the Department of
State. Nation assistance is an over arching category
of U.S. theater security engagement that includes
subcategories like HCA and security assistance,283 but
puts emphasis on long-term development, which is
not an explicit characteristic of other activities.284 In its
widest application, nation assistance covers projects
that its individual subcategories may not. Nation
assistance operations may be conducted independent
of other operations or exercises, or in conjunction
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with other U.S. Government agencies, international
government organizations (IGOs), NGOs, and host
nation authorities.285 These activities carry more
gravity and significance in economic development and
governance and may be akin to the stability operations
projects conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite
the very beneficial nature of nation assistance in
facilitating long-term security and stability, the U.S.
military has often shied away from such missions,
except when absolutely necessary. Reluctance to
accept this mission stems from its potential to drain
resources from combat duties, its long-term nature,
and the reduction in military readiness caused by
concentrating on secondary skills to the detriment
of primary skills training. To date, U.S.-led nation
assistance is rare in Africa, but a hypothetical mission
using USAF Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy
Operational Repair Squadron Engineers (REDHORSE)
illustrates the concept:
In remote areas of the world, particularly Africa, air
transport may be the only means of contact to the outside world. . . . [REDHORSE] could be airlifted into these
locations and begin providing support by rebuilding or
constructing airfields to permit an open air supply route
to that particular location. These airstrips, in turn, would
act as conduits for supplying the region with food and
healthcare. Construction units could also serve dual purposes in meeting economic and health interests by using
their capability to drill water wells and erect needed facilities. . . . Additionally, these units could repair existing facilities to allow electricity, water, and other needed
life support systems to become functional or construct
earthen dams or the like to protect against natural disaster and meet environmental security needs.286

Through its use elsewhere in the world, the U.S. military
has honed over time a nation assistance tradition that
could serve African security and stability well.
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On the political side of nation assistance, military
forces may do more than help educate and train
a professional military, they can actually build an
improved organization. Security sector reform (SSR)
can improve detrimental organizations by “organizing
new institutions and units from the ministerial level
to the smallest maneuver unit. Building infrastructure
capability—such as personnel, logistics, and
intelligence—is necessary for sustaining the new
host-nation capacity.”287 An example of this approach
is how the United States, France, and the United
Kingdom have coordinated to reestablish professional
and accountable ministries of defense and armed
forces respectively in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte
d’Ivoire following devastating and interlocking civil
wars in western Africa. The U.S. Government’s nation
assistance to Liberia included funding and running a
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR)
program for former military and militia members,
recruiting and vetting new recruits and civil staff, and
training and equipping a right-sized force inculcated
with professional skills, proper understanding of civilmilitary relations, and respect for law and rights. The
new Liberian Ministry of National Defense (MND)
civilians completed this process, too. Its staff learned
topics from coordination skills to ethics, military
justice, protocol, logistics, finance, planning, and public
affairs to help them forge an effective bureaucracy.
With proper education, pay, equipment, facilities, and
procedures, all instituted through mutual consultation
between the United States and Liberian governments,
the new MND became a model for other Liberian
ministries. Nation assistance in its grandest scale
approaches the types and levels of economic and
governance assistance needed for security and stability
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in African countries and is the closest that U.S. military
forces may come under current practices to realize
African needs. However, current practices are such
that significant nation assistance projects rarely occur
except as a byproduct of combat with U.S. forces.
Even though military theater engagement has
proven to be useful as a stand-alone program or
as part of larger interagency efforts it does have
room for improvement, and there are definite
limits to what it can accomplish. Assuming that
improved security and stability in Africa are
priorities for theater engagement projects, one low
cost improvement effort can be achieved by better
cooperation among North American, European, and
other donors to reduce administration and overhead
costs.288 Additionally, the program’s impact could be
enhanced by broadening the capacity of African
nationals through larger coordinated programs and
by increasing the duration of these programs enabling
longer lasting effects. The SSR example given for Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire is an example of this
approach that simultaneously leverages U.S., French,
and British efforts to stop the violence that occurred
among these countries. The Scandinavian countries
combine efforts that share resources and programs to
the point that individual country efforts are sometimes
indistinguishable from the larger “Norden” group
identity.289 Working together with other countries
may also reduce the crosscutting competition between
donors that was frequent during the Cold War and that
can undermine common goals.290 This multinational
approach takes more effort and reduces the recognition
received by the donor, but its heightened impact on
improving degraded conditions in Africa makes it
worth the effort. Another improvement to theater
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engagement, especially from the receivers’ perspective,
is to support regional cooperation initiatives, such
as the African Standby Force, the African Union’s
standing force for Africans to respond to African crises
and catastrophes.291 In ACOTA, this approach is used
with sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS
and the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) to consult and participate in peacekeeping,
thereby reinforcing the inherent multinational nature
of these operations.292 Another example is the subregional MEDFLAG operations, which provide
medical and humanitarian aid from the U.S., European,
and Asian participants to multiple African countries.293
For small African countries, dealing with major
international donors through a regional organization
is less overwhelming, and for regional powers such as
Nigeria, South Africa, Libya, or Ethiopia it allows them
to maintain their influence and feel less threatened by
activities from foreigners.294 Regional initiatives also
better harness foreign-local collaboration because
more expertise and resources remain on the African
side, which builds more capacity and persistence since
neighboring countries can reinforce and aid each other
better after donor support is gone. Within internal donor
country politics, regional initiatives also reduce the
undue influence of country advocates with particular
clout, which should make programs more efficient
and persistent.295 Even with improvements in donor
cooperation and acting with regional organizations to
enhance the effects of military engagement, inherent
limits remain in how security cooperation programs
can support underlying African security factors.
The many varieties of military engagement in Africa
usually meet the foreign sponsors’ interests through
acquainting military leaders with potential partners,
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providing familiarization with a region, establishing
access to areas, and serving as “good insurance that
the United States will have militarily competent,
dependable regional allies in crisis,”296 which is why
these programs continue even through lean donor
government budgets. In professionalizing local
armed forces and making them better contributors to
stability, theater engagement activities are generally
useful to host nations through the education,
training, and exercising of armed forces; in assisting
them with operational missions like peacekeeping;
and through other security assistance and related
programs. However, these security assistance
programs only tangentially address some of the root
causes of economic and political problems. Although
better at addressing these core issues, HCA and the
wider nation assistance programs are still limited in
aiding development because they focus mainly on
military related applications, since these programs
are military missions, and lower priority ones at that.
Current AFRICOM military-security programs lack
the depth, breadth, and persistence needed to solve
Africa’s real security and stability problems.297 Current
foreign military engagement is also often limited in
its effects because of general concerns that military
involvement in economic and governing affairs sets
the wrong example, and employing local forces in
these ways gives them too much power, conflicts
with civil organizations, and diverts them from their
core military mission.298 Thus despite the fact that the
U.S. Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) Program has
a charter to support security and stability in foreign
countries, in part through improving their economic
and governing base, it falls short of its mark, even when
used in conjunction with other elements of power. The
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U.S. TSC Program as now conducted is useful but of
minor assistance in combating the real problems of
Africa that undermine its peace and prosperity.299 In
any strategy used to support stability and security in
Africa, this program will be a necessary part, but it is
insufficient to achieve a significant lasting impact on
its own. There are better ways to use foreign military
forces in Africa than are currently employed.
Military Lead.
No process is sacrosanct—DJS [Director, Joint Staff]
shall break and redesign as needed—outcomes are what
counts.
ADM Michael G. Mullen,
CJCS Guidance for 2008-2009300

If much of Africa is in dire need of assistance in
establishing security and stability within its countries
and across its borders, would it make more sense to
change the current insufficient approaches for ones
that hold more promise? For the past 65 years, the U.S.
military has been deeply involved in reestablishing
security and stability directly in foreign countries and
in improving their long-term economic well-being
and political governance. U.S. military forces have
done this from Germany and Japan after World War
II to the in-progress efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
By doctrine, stability operations and nation assistance
may occur before, during, or after conflict,301 so a more
active peacetime military role in Africa is possible. Such
a military option could adopt as its “long term goal
. . . to help develop indigenous capacity for security,
essential services, a viable market economy, rule of
law, [and] democratic institutions . . . in its extreme,
stability operations means nation-building.”302 With
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planning skills, manpower, resources, and appropriate
expertise coordinating reserve component personnel
and the whole of the U.S. Government, military forces
could be the lead of a concerted effort to significantly
improve peace within Africa and set it on a much
delayed course to prosperity. This concept of the
military leading other government agencies in attaining
security and stability through economic and governing
initiatives is explored in this section by examining why
and how this might be accomplished, and the problems
and negative consequences that detract from this as
an approach. This is a reasonable option if the reader
accepts that what military forces need to accomplish
to prevent violence and instability is changing, and
thus the military’s role in security missions is also
changing.303
A military lead for the U.S. Government’s efforts
to improve Africa’s security and its economic and
political well-being is not farfetched. A military lead
approach has practical advantages, strong advocates,
and to some degree is already occurring through the
establishment and actions of USAFRICOM. Following
World War II, the U.S. military had a leading role in
countering the greatest threat to stabilizing Europe
and Asia: the economic and political challenge of
communism. Later, during the Vietnam War, the U.S.
military had an increasingly important role in the
U.S. Government’s peace and prosperity programs
through a civil-military single-manager concept over
“sociopolitical reforms, economic stimuli, and military
assistance.”304 Giving the U.S. military a similar role
in Africa against today’s leading threat, the economic
and political ills that spawn instability and terrorism,
would follow these precedents. When USAFRICOM
was proposed, its initial stated purpose was to bring
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“peace and security to Africa by promoting health,
education, democracy, and economic growth”—
seemingly a nation-building program.305 Critics of the
military leading a whole of government effort fear
that “the Pentagon’s plans to take economic assistance
programs begun in Iraq and Afghanistan and make
them permanent and world-wide, with more than
$1 billion allocated to them annually,”306 and it is
assumed that these programs would be provided
to Africa. Supporters of an expanding military role
believe “that defeat of internal threats to basic public
order and restoration and maintenance of minimum
essential political, security, and economic conditions
within victim states combined might constitute the
new ‘major combat operation’ for U.S. land forces.”307
As noted earlier, Thomas Barnett believes that the
U.S. Army needs to promote and sustain regional
security to promote U.S. and international interests by
engaging not just “military and insurgent forces, but
to concentrate on economic, cultural, and sociopolitical
structures and issues.”308 The conservative Heritage
Foundation and others favor “Pentagon centered
involvement . . . to include a broader combination of
diplomacy, humanitarian aid, and poverty eradication,”
in support of U.S. Government interests.309 Despite
reluctance for this mission, even DoD officials like the
former Undersecretary for Personnel and Readiness
have concluded that to prevent future wars, the U.S.
military must engage in nation building.310 Although
controversial, a strong case can be made that a U.S.
military lead for the U.S. Government when interacting
with African states and organizations to help Africans
improve their unstable situation is a possibility that
has merits.
The military has often led this kind of effort because
there were no other viable options. Since the U.S.
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military has been effective in this role, a reinforcing
expectation persists that military forces should be
the lead in state building for practical or expedient
reasons. The problem of low intensity conflict, crime,
and instability that simmers across Africa “defies
purely military solutions, it requires a cross-discipline
approach which recognizes the interplay of social,
economic, political, and military factors.”311 Since
development and defense issues are so closely related,
they should be addressed in tandem under one strategy
and unified leadership,312 a role in which U.S. military
forces have experience. In past and current operations,
the U.S. military has taken the lead in stabilization and
reconstruction operations because civilian agencies
lacked adequate resources, the mandate, or the
capability to do so. This happened in Bosnia where
the military Stabilization Force (SFOR) had to expand
its mission to assist international organizations in
typically civilian endeavors, recognizing that SFOR was
“moving into the area of nation building but saw no
alternative if SFOR was ever going to withdraw. . . .”313
Similarly in Haiti in 1996 when American troops left the
country, conditions deteriorated to pre-intervention
levels of the early 1990s because the “civilian agencies
that replaced military forces did not have the same
resources available, and the Haitian economy, judicial
system, and political leaders obstructed reforms.”314
The U.S. DoD has been able to gather the resources and
authorities needed for soft power problems and has the
leadership and processes to tackle complex operations.
The military could lead when civilian organizations lack
the necessary means to succeed, as happened in Bosnia
and Haiti. The military lead is especially needed when
security is so bad that civilian organizations cannot
function under the conditions, yet to meet national
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goals economic development and governance must
improve or military and political failures will ensue.315
Preparing the military to assume the lead position
in such circumstances allows it to be better prepared
when it must assume this role, or when deemed best
for national interests to do so.316 Because of its practical
merits and existing operations, military lead of U.S.
Government efforts could promote security, economic
development, and improved governance in Africa.
It is important to note that a military lead of U.S.
Government efforts in Africa should not be a “goes it
alone” effort. Military lead needs the support of the
whole U.S. Government, IGO, and NGO expertise,
as much as civilian organizations sometimes need
the capabilities of the military to enforce security and
stability.317 The pantheon of participants in a military
lead effort would remain the same as a civilian effort, but
their relationships would change to allow the military
personnel to organize, plan, and execute the effort.
U.S. military units, both civil affairs and combat units,
have shown they are able to execute primarily civilian
responsibilities, with limited or full assistance from
host governments and U.S. or international agencies.318
The learning curve for such activities is steep, though,
even when using reserve component forces with
consummate civilian skills. The lag in learning how to
apply these skills can be costly, as well, as demonstrated
by the initially erratic civil-military efforts shortly after
the commencement of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.
However, the U.S. military is mastering these economic
and governance functions, and is better able to integrate
the expertise of other agencies to achieve common
peace and prosperity goals.319 Under a military lead,
there may be needed organizations that resent the
military taking the lead role, or who may be unable to
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cooperate with the military in this manner. NGOs may
be the most difficult case because they are independent,
governed by international impartiality principles, and
often prefer to work at the operational and policy
levels away from the taint of parochial organizations,
especially military ones.320 Their aid, however, is
essential in humanitarian assistance, economic
development, and political governance, and they tend
to be focused, faster in response, more experienced in
their fields, and remain longer to ensure continuity
than similar foreign military efforts. To overcome
these barriers between the two sides, common goals
can improve cooperation between the actions of NGOs
and reluctant government agencies and those of U.S.
forces by allowing indirect coordination through UN
or U.S. civilian agencies. A common direction fosters
unified action: the synchronization of government and
nongovernment activities with military operations.321
This proposal would broaden the unified action
concept to allow civilian cooperation under military
leadership, especially if such leadership maintained
a discreet coordinating role much as SCAP had when
working with Japanese government organizations
after World War II.322 This same integrated approach
towards a common goal could allow for the
coordination of various agencies under a military
lead donor government effort with host governments,
international organizations, NGOs, agencies of other
countries and private entities—the definition of the
comprehensive approach. Such unified action creates a
community of purpose based upon accommodating the
concerns of all participants, a common understanding
of a situation, shared purposes, and an agreed level
of cooperation.323 In this way, common goals could
guide the endeavors of others with military lead for
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U.S. Government efforts in order to get the best from
all participants assisting Africa.
Unified action in assisting a region’s economic
development or improving governance is a broad
but relatively weak link between U.S. Government
participation and the agencies of other countries, NGOs,
and the private sector due to the sometimes diverging
national and organizational interests involved. Within
the U.S. Government, however, agencies should strive
to achieve the more demanding level of coordination
called unity of effort, given shared national security
goals and executive leadership, but this is not often
fully realized through the interagency process. Unity
of effort is one of the key dimensions for stability and
peace operations, and requires multilevel support
from participants to succeed, whether under military
or civilian lead.324 This is the whole of government
approach, the collaborative efforts of departments and
agencies of the U.S. Government toward a single goal.325
Because of its importance to successful operations,
every presidential administration since President
John F. Kennedy has tried to further institutionalize
unity of effort within the executive branch. In 2005 the
Bush administration focused interagency cooperation
on stability operations through National Security
Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44. This document built
upon the Clinton administration’s Presidential Decision
Document (PDD) 56 for Managing Complex Contingency Operations to allow for better coordination efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan under the State Department, but could be reapplied to also allow a DoD lead
option in Africa. NSPD-44 also requires other agencies
to build their capabilities to participate in stability
operations and, as an extension, state building. These
improved capabilities would make coordination
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under DoD (or another agency) more effective under
the whole of government approach.326 To enhance
cooperation and understanding under military
leadership (or likewise military subordination under
civilian lead) all participants should together train,
conduct planning, share procedures and terminology,
and perform other preparatory activities needed to
succeed. With this type of cooperation as a goal, FM
3-07 was written with input from many nonmilitary
sources in order for it to serve as a common reference
for all.327 Such exercising and training are second
nature to military forces, which is another advantage
to a military lead scheme—better preparation of the
participants under practiced military tutelage before
they are needed. Planning and integration are required
to improve the whole of government approach to assist
in solving problems in places like Africa and, because
of its strong tradition in these processes, the military is
an excellent candidate to lead other organizations.
Actual coordination and execution of a plan in the
field is just as important as the preparation phase among
organizations, and could occur through existing centers
that transform themselves into whole of government
headquarters. One such case is a military civil affairs
unit’s Civil-Military Operations Center, which could
not only “serve as the primary coordination interface
for the U.S. armed forces, humanitarian organizations,
IGOs, NGOs, multinational military forces, and other
civilian agencies of the U.S. Government” (its intended
purpose),328 but with proper representation and
authorities from the organizations involved could also
serve as a command center directing efforts in security,
economic development, and governance in an efficient
and effective manner. The expertise and resources of a
military lead could also be inserted into other existing
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coordinating bodies like the State Department’s
deployable Integrated Planning Cell “to synchronize
and coordinate USG[overnment] planning,” or in an
embassy’s country team. These State Department
organizations are flexible in their size and composition,
and can be adjusted to meet such circumstances.329
An advantage of inserting a military planning
and execution authority into either of these State
Department organizations is the organizational skills
and resources that military planning and execution of
operations brings while still under the overall purview
of the State Department or an ambassador—a more
acceptable approach for some critics. Such hybrid
military-civilian organizations blend their parochial
identities, which is the point of whole of government
operations. Blurring the stovepipes of organizations in
order to mix capabilities is the goal—although doing
so means that whoever is in charge (and someone
must be) may not matter as much as whether the goals
are being achieved. With the proper motivation and
resources, the U.S. military “is the world’s greatest
nation building institution . . . [and] the United States
has rarely accomplished long-term policy goals after
any conflict without an extended American military
presence to ensure proper results from the peace.”330
Thus planning and execution, before or after conflict,
through military processes and personnel employing
the experience of other government agencies may be a
viable way to assist Africa.
To make a military lead and civilian hybrid operation
work will require changes in the U.S. Government. The
military, for instance, should develop and dedicate
nation assistance specialists with broad backgrounds
in the methods and roles of related government and
nongovernmental organizations, and judiciously
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assign such officers to appropriate government staffs.331
Select military units may need to specialize as well to
perform specific functions to support and interact with
other government organizations or NGOs. Reserve
component units, with their diverse civilian expertise,
or civil-military units may be best suited for these
lead or support roles. U.S. military efforts involving
such units during nation assistance operations
in the Balkans have been commended by civilian
administrators.332 Modern operations, however, have
shown that stability operations and nation assistance
should not be confined to specialists, although
specialists are needed. Many operations may be of too
great a magnitude, and their concurrent nature with
traditional military operations so entangled, that any
unit may need to employ these skills and knowledge at
some point. Training for all units should include skills
and considerations that support immediate or followon tasks to achieve stability, but also with an eye to
economic development and enhancing governance—a
different mindset than decisive combat operations.333 If
the military will lead such operations in the field, units
must better understand and execute this mission, which
is a challenging requirement given the other tasks that
a combat unit must master. Such enhanced integration
of the DoD and other government agencies under one
command would require statutory changes, especially
because such changes already seem necessary for the
much less ambitious unity of effort integration and
participation in nontraditional missions now attempted
for USAFRICOM.334
Changes in other parts of the government must also
be made for this option to work. If a standing cadre of
security, economic, and governance professionals is
needed, and such an organization would be beneficial
to jumpstart any contingency, then U.S. Government
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agencies with smaller manning authorizations than
DoD will need to expand to allow regular training
and contingency preparation to be effective. Such
an expansion would counter the manning problem
now experienced in the more modest experiment of
integrating interagency personnel into USAFRICOM,335
which will initially field only one non-DoD civilian
for every 100 DoD members on the AFRICOM staff.
Too few personnel are assigned to State Department,
USAID, and other government agencies for their
own missions as well as these enhanced integrated
missions due to chronic under resourcing.336 This
imbalance can be seen as another reason that supports
a military lead solution, which could fully leverage
and efficiently organize the strapped assets of other
departments to sustain Africa’s drive for peace and
prosperity. However, such “continued growth in
military capability in these areas is self-reinforcing,
accelerating the downward spiral of civilian capacity
in favor of more expedient military solutions,”337
enmeshing the military even further in these affairs. A
U.S. military lead of other U.S. Government resources,
and, indirectly, non-American or nongovernment
assets, should only be a temporary measure until the
State Department and others build expertise to truly
lead under NSPD-44, or during conditions where
nonmilitary organizations cannot or will not operate.338
It is worth stressing that this solution should always
work in tandem with functioning host nation agencies
or competent citizens whenever possible to ensure
the capacity building and continuity such assistance
should bring.339 There are some situations, including
cases of extreme instability, in which a U.S. military
lead role for stability and security operations may be
beneficial to assist Africans resolve their economic and
governance problems. But the many changes needed to
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modify military, other government, and host country
institutions suggests that this may be a difficult and
even undesirable option.
Just because professional military forces could
lead efforts in Africa does not mean that they should.
Despite the merits of a military lead in terms of unity
of effort or a comprehensive approach, current western
democratic values and experience do not easily tolerate
a military organization like USAFRICOM directing
economic development and governance aid to support
local governments and regional organizations.
Although circumstances in Africa may be the worst
in the world, the situation is not drastic enough for
Western politicians or the public to call for radical
measures like military oversight of traditionally civilian
functions. Not only are Western countries probably not
willing to overthrow centuries of successful military
subordination for the uncertain prospects of speeding
improvements in Africa, there are no national interests
at stake with any donor country to warrant such
dramatic departures, as could be argued occurred at the
time of the Marshall Plan. The improvements needed
to make a military lead option viable would simply
reinforce stronger military attributes, often at the
expense of other departments. Some State Department
and USAID officials already believe that USAFRICOM
may become the lead for U.S. efforts in Africa.340 As
evidence, critics note that DoD control of official U.S.
aid money has grown from 3 percent to 22 percent in the
past decade, while USAID’s share has dropped from
65 to 40 percent.341 Regardless of what organization
is leading, the imbalance of resources and personnel
available for nonmilitary government organizations
to properly assist African nations must be obtained
to ensure smoother cooperation towards national
goals.342 Overemphasizing military capabilities also
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runs the danger of making the military an attractive
tool of choice for situations in which its use is not
appropriate, or of overestimating military capabilities
where they may be of only lesser value.343 Legally,
there are also problems with a leading economic
and governance role performed by the military. U.S.
laws governing roles and missions of government
organizations would need to be revised, and funding
to specifically allow the military to act on economic and
governance issues would have to be expanded.344 Even
if these actions are taken, international law remains
an obstacle since it limits how military forces may
act in economic development to provide security and
order, unless such action is directed by an authority
like the UN Security Council.345 Domestic factors and
traditional expectations, then, make a military lead of
U.S. Government economic development efforts an
awkward option.
Another reason why USAFRICOM should not be
the lead in U.S. Government African affairs is that
military forces are not widely trusted. USAFRICOM
has had a poor initial reception in Africa following
decades of U.S. Government neglect or misdirection
in the name of security. Inadequate consultation with
African leaders during the formation of USAFRICOM,
and the prospect of neo-colonialism that has haunted
Africans from since the days of Cold War engagement
to today’s perception that renewed interest in Africa is
just a front for gaining resources and fighting terrorism
are barriers to effective development.346 Africans are
not the only ones who are not convinced of the efficacy
of USAFRICOM’s more focused mission. The difficulty
that other U.S. departments have in filling current
USAFRICOM personnel assignments may be due as
much to a skepticism or hostility towards the role of
the military in Africa as to resource shortages.347 An
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assistant director for program development and policy
at the Africa Faith and Justice Network remarked that
“the blending of military and civilian agencies and the
overreach of the Department of Defense . . . [is] putting
a velvet glove of humanitarian aid over the fist of the
military.”348 Some U.S. Government aid officials also do
not want to be stigmatized by being directly associated
with the military, regardless of other advantages such
an association offers.349 Such concerns are not new, and
were also expressed during the early Vietnam War
years when the fear was that the militarization of policy
would give military men influence in areas that had
previously been the exclusive domain of civilians.350
On top of all these problems, some skeptics doubt that
the military alone, or as a lead, has been very effective
in these roles. One study found that in 51 cases where
U.S. or British forces intervened, they were successful
only 25 percent of the time, and some of those situations
could probably have been stabilized and reconstruction
carried out without military intervention.351 A military
lead effort for economic development and governance
improvement would fail without the support of crucial
African, international, and U.S. Government elements.
So far, this support has not been gained and will not be
obtained under current circumstances.
Although the U.S. military has a long history of
involvement in stability operations before and after
conflict and with peace building, its results have
been mixed. Military forces do have the capability
to organize, lead, and assist in complex foreign
development and governance issues to further stability
and security in places like Africa. They could assume
a lead role through various existing structures and by
overseeing the sharing of resources, processes, and
training needed to make cooperation more effective.
To streamline its role, the military should groom more
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specialists and specialty units, and generally orient
other units toward development and governance
missions. Other government agencies will also need
more robust resources and training to better synchronize
their efforts. Even with these improvements, the deep
resources, established processes, and can-do military
attitude could overwhelm cross-discipline efforts when
the military is in the lead. Critics of this approach fear
that continued overreliance on the military eviscerates
the civilian, international, and nongovernmental
organizations that specialize in these roles and sets a
poor example of civil-military relations for the people
that these efforts are meant to help. Furthermore, U.S.
public expectation will not allow the military to lead
civilian organizations in most cases. Given the realities
of the situation, meritorious though a military lead
might seem, perhaps a better solution is to reverse the
positions and adequately resource civilian institutions
to lead along with appropriate support from military
forces, such as USAFRICOM.
Civilian Lead.
However, we cannot meet the challenges of today and
those of tomorrow with military power alone. We must
guard against further militarization of our foreign
policy . . . it is vital that we not only develop our military
capabilities, but also strengthen capacity of other
government agencies and that of our foreign partners.
ADM Michael Mullen
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff352

So far, many topics have been covered by this paper
with the intent to impart the importance of Africa to U.S.
affairs; the links between problems that Africa faces
in economic development, governance, security, and
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stability; and two ways that USAFRICOM can address
some of these problems through improving the current
method of theater engagement, or leading a unified U.S.
Government or international comprehensive approach.
Both approaches offer advantages, but also significant
disadvantages. Thus a third option of subordinating
U.S. military efforts squarely under the capable
leadership of robust diplomatic and development
organizations is tentatively being pursued by the U.S.
Government. Most of the elements by which the U.S.
and other governments can assist Africans towards
peace and prosperity already exist; they just need to
be properly structured and resourced. The U.S. and
other militaries are important government elements
needed under a civilian lead because of the military’s
contacts with influential organizations in African
societies; effective resources; specialized development
and security expertise; and experience in organizing,
directing, and executing complex operations. These
are the same strengths that support arguments for a
military lead, but here they would be employed under
civilian organizations such as USAID or the State
Department. If these institutions were adequately
resourced and properly directed, a civilian-lead U.S.
Government team would be readily accepted by the
international and African communities. Not only
could this combination better help Africans attain the
security and stability they need through economic
development and improved governance, but may better
serve U.S. national security and military interests in the
process. The methods used in regional development
and improvement are widely known and debated,
and thus beyond the scope of this already lengthy
tome. Therefore, this section focuses on the continuing
improvements being made toward strengthening
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civilian while incorporating military capabilities,
and offers some additional recommendations to
ensure the future success of this arrangement. If the
U.S. Government and the international community
are serious about assisting Africans to follow a path
to prosperity, proper governance, and security, the
following proposals outline how these objectives may
be achieved.
Because USAFRICOM is perceived by some as
becoming the proconsul of U.S. Government affairs in
Africa—interfering outside of its own proper role—a
more appropriate U.S. Government civilian institution
like USAID should reassume this role through
adequate resourcing and support. Many Africans,
suspicious of any increased military role wonder why
the U.S. Government lead for assistance is not given
to an existing institution that specializes in promoting
development and is more locally and internationally
acceptable.353 USAID is active throughout Africa and it
has assisted there for decades and is respected for its
work. Civilian whole of government leadership under
USAID offers the advantages of organic expertise in
economic and development issues and its inherent
focus on long-term solutions; neither of which are
integral to military efforts since they are viewed as
secondary missions. The existing nebulous division of
labor between civilian and military is also perceived as a
competition for funds, which undercuts the professional
developers.354 The current U.S. political system brings
both military and civilian efforts together under the
same leadership only at the chief executive level. Since
long-term African affairs, like development, rarely rise
to sufficient national interest levels that would demand
coordination by the U.S. President, competition over
goals and resources occurs at lower levels to the current
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detriment of civilian efforts. The National Security
Council (NSC) is supposed to coordinate and lead U.S.
Government departments through coordinated foreign
policy advice for the President but, to do so, the NSC
leadership would have to recognize that economic
and governance problems in Africa are security issues
and that Africa’s importance warrants long-term
oversight and coordination of whole of government
efforts towards stated U.S. goals. Such recognition
has not yet occurred at this level. The process to attain
national security goals in Africa should be civilian,
with military capabilities synchronized toward “soft
power to promote participation in government, spur
economic development, and address the root causes
of conflict . . .,” which is the comprehensive approach
to stability operations and peace building advocated
by FM 3-07.355 Assuming that a civilian organization
like USAID is better suited than a military force to
lead whole of government efforts in Africa, some of
the ways this approach is being adopted will now be
discussed.
Since traditional means to coordinate U.S. policy
and efforts have been unable to fulfill stability and
stabilization requirements, another method has
evolved within the U.S. Government. The 2005 NSPD44 requires the State Department “to coordinate
and lead U.S. Government efforts to prepare, plan
for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization
activities . . . to include balancing civilian and military
activities.”356 This mission includes improving the
U.S. Government’s institutional capacity to intervene
successfully before, during, and after security problems
arise.357 Given the will to assist, the NSPD-44 mandate
is broad enough to incorporate improving conditions
in Africa to achieve stabilization and security through
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economic development and better governance. A
decade ago, such an effort in Haiti under USAID’s
lead synchronized civilian and military stabilization
and reconstruction activities, but achieved mixed
results.358 The Haiti mission demonstrated that such an
arrangement could work, but that USAID needed more
resources, robust planning and executing abilities, and
access to wider expertise. These lessons were learned
again in Iraq and Afghanistan, so that by 2007 the State
Department formed the Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), to “promote
the security of the United States through improved
coordination, planning, and implementation of
reconstruction and stabilization activities,”359 fulfilling
NSPD-44 and DoDD 3000.05 expectations. To solve
those earlier shortcomings, S/CRS instituted several
means to enable its peace building mission. First was
the Interagency Management System, consisting of an
interagency stabilization and reconstruction decisionmaking policy committee, a civilian team of strategic
planners, and deployable advance teams to balance
its capabilities with those found in military units. For
more depth in running its operations, S/CRS also has a
whole of government planning framework for conflict
prevention planning in both crisis and long-term
situations and the Civilian Response Corps, a three
tiered system to muster personnel and expertise akin
to the military’s active duty and reserve forces.360 To
build upon these gains, USAID is also developing the
concept of Smart Power and Development to explore
how to “strengthen our development principles while
building civilian-military cooperation . . . [recognizing]
a growing consensus that a smart power strategy
should comprise both military and non-military tools
to address instability. . . .”361 Its intent is to make
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diplomacy and development by the U.S. Government
“more agile, responsive, and complimentary [sic].”362
Although still being implemented, these are all salutary
steps in the right direction to improve the ability of the
civilian component to plan, execute, and lead stability
efforts through economic development and good
governance.
Since civilian organizations are already struggling
to complete their rebuilding responsibilities in Iraq and
Afghanistan, more resources and people are needed to
enable an expanded and extensive mission in Africa
as proposed in this paper. Because of its mission and
expertise, the responsibility for U.S. Government
foreign capacity building and development belongs
to USAID,363 which one member of Congress called a
checkwriting agency because it cannot fulfill its core
missions without contractor support. From its height
in 1968 while providing support for the Vietnam and
other Cold War efforts, USAID has decreased in size
from 17,500 employees to 2,400 in 2005. That small
staff currently provides support in Iraq, Afghanistan,
and other parts of the world. More people are needed
by USAID, and the Obama administration is adding
281 new officers. These will not be enough, and it will
take years to fully integrate even these few.364 To obtain
more resources and people and to better use what it has,
the State Department proposes to follow the example
of DoD’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) with a
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR).
The QDDR will identify the State Department as the
lead for the coordination effort of all agencies involved
in diplomacy and development, to match resources
and funds to strategic priorities, and to influence
long-term policy, funding, and resourcing decisions
within a common overarching vision.365 The QDDR
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could succeed in giving diplomatic and development
efforts the credibility needed by Congress to gain real
backing and bridge the culture, capability, and resource
disparities among USAID, the State Department, and
DoD. A congressional advocate may also be needed
to rebalance some defense funds dedicated for future
training, planning, and execution of stability operations
to diplomacy and development funds to correct the 17
to 1 spending ratio now in place.366 However, putting
DoD and the State Department in direct competition for
funds in a tight budget process undermines the unity of
effort championed by this paper.367 Some inherent civilmilitary stability operations capability must remain
within the military for combat and its aftermath, and
for conditions where civilian agencies cannot or have
not yet started to operate.368 However, transferring
longer-term responsibilities and capabilities to civilian
professionals, and ultimately to indigenous personnel,
allows military forces to better focus on their core
missions, strengthens the ability of civilian agencies
and host governments to accomplish their roles, and
removes the specter of a militarized foreign policy that
concerns so many.369 Not only would development
professionals be enabled, but ultimately more
security would be obtained because in unsettled third
world regions like Africa, development and stability
assistance investments have far greater influence on
security than the same money put directly into U.S.
armed forces.370 Putting more resources into civilian
organizations balances the ability to stabilize and
develop areas whose security is weak—making it an
investment against having to send in foreign troops.
Although more resources and manning may be
required by the civilian agencies of the U.S. Government
who are tasked with foreign capacity building, better
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understanding and coordination of roles, resources,
and policy is important too—and less expensive
to implement. Rather than allocating entirely new
resources during fiscally constrained times, what may
be needed is an approach to:
share resources among U.S. Government agencies and
organizations while working toward a common goal.
These resources—financial, military, intelligence, law
enforcement, diplomatic, developmental, and strategic
communications— are often limited in availability. . . .
To achieve the broad success envisioned in a whole of
government engagement, all must be integral to unified
action.”371

Unified action is also attained through shared
understanding, as found in FM 3-07 written with,
by, and for representatives from many nondefense
organizations involved in stabilization and peace
building. It is a reference for “other government agencies, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), agencies
of other governments, international organizations,
nongovernment organizations, and private sector
entities” covering how military and civilian efforts
complement each other.372 Published a year later in
2009, Principles of the USG Planning Framework for
Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation,
a parallel whole of government document, was written
to bind reconstruction efforts closer together for the
numerous parts of the U.S. Government.373 Towards
comprehensive action, the United States Institute of
Peace (USIP) Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability,
and Relief Operations strives to facilitate actions among
international organizations, NGOs, U.S. Government
civilian agencies, and the military.374 These recent
coordination documents are complemented by
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other organizational efforts to improve interaction
of government efforts under a civilian lead. Among
coordinating bodies, the USIP launched the Working
Group on Civil-Military Relations in Non-Permissive
Environments. It is composed of NGOs, DoD, the State
Department, and USAID, and meets to discuss issues
of relationships, doctrine, and other matters of mutual
concern.375 Another unified effort by these players is
the Center for Complex Operations covering irregular
warfare, peace operations, and stability operations to
build a community of practice of civilian and military
operators to prepare for complex operations.376
The process to expand resources for diplomatic
and development efforts and to better understand,
coordinate, and execute interagency and international
efforts is developing in the right direction. USAFRICOM
and DoD should wholeheartedly support these efforts,
as they are in the best interests of the United States and
the U.S. military.
These changes designed to strength the role of
development and governance to achieve stability and
security indicate their importance in foreign policy.
Enlarging and reinforcing civilian lead and participation
is the right alternative. There are many more things that
could be done based upon the analysis in this paper,
but two points need to be emphasized to complete
this primer. First, U.S. national security and stability
interests are best served when DoD squarely supports
an effective civilian lead agency like USAID that has
the expertise, resources, and international acceptance
to accomplish the tasks that will result in long-term
peace and prosperity. Although many processes are
in place to improve the capabilities to accomplish
this, one remains to be answered: who is in charge of
regional efforts? Who is the equivalent of a regional
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combatant commander to guide regional development
actions, as does the commander of USAFRICOM in
military affairs, to balance, or monitor, the combatant
commander’s very potent influence? One way is
to appoint an equivalent diplomatic proconsul, “a
regional super ambassador with clear authority to
integrate all U.S. Government activities in a region.”
[Another way to enhance unity of effort is to create
a] “Standing Regional Security Council composed of
senior representatives from all of the national security
departments and agencies,”377 perhaps as subdivisions
of the NSC or within the State Department’s regional
bureaus. These options support security through
long-term economic development and governance, as
advocated throughout this paper, to enable agencies
like USAID to play a leading part. Either option offers
a clear leader for attaining U.S. Government interests
and ensures effective use of efforts and resources in
making departments and agencies equal partners in
the interagency process.378
Just as proper roles and resourcing of each U.S.
Government organization under strong civilian
leadership is important for unity of effort in assisting
Africans, so too is that this is accomplished under a
comprehensive international effort that brings together
the many worldwide participants in a unified action to
supplement (and perhaps occasionally to resuscitate)
local African organizations. Each country offers
particular skills and expertise needed to improve
Africa’s condition, and all are limited by funding,
personnel, and resources in what can be accomplished.
Better international coordination of these efforts,
government and otherwise, would greatly help local
governments navigate through literally thousands of
well-intentioned piecemeal projects. Donors could
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share lead responsibilities by sub-region or expertise
to best benefit recipients and, in so doing, work more
efficiently towards improving the economic and
governing conditions that lead to security.379 Such
coordination complicates assistance work for donors,
but magnifies its potential good, which is the intent
of NSPD-44.380 Donors should sublimate recognition
for their largesse, often an important motivation for
countries currying favor with a recipient, toward the
greater good of establishing peace and prosperity in
Africa. When support is provided by African partners
with the greater good in mind, local capacity is improved
while fostering long-term gains and promoting African
self-sufficiency. When done together with regional
organizations, like ECOWAS rather than individual
countries, coordinated donor efforts simplify the
process for Africans, who share more responsibility,
too. This leverages the ability of African states to sustain
success and may also reduce instability recidivism,
since any problems that do arise are African problems
to solve through a regional organization instead of
becoming international problems that may be ignored
or that may serve as excuses for foreign intervention.381
Coordinating efforts between international participants
can ensure that limited development funds go farther
in support of African security and stability operations.
U.S. Government and international civilian
organizations have the mandate and experience
needed to help Africans improve their situation. The
U.S. and other militaries should play their accepted
role in enforcing security and stability directly and
indirectly through economic development and good
governance, but firmly under overarching civilian
oversight. The perception that a robust USAFRICOM
may overstep this accepted order requires that the
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existing system of procedures and proposals between
civilian and military organizations be reinforced and
improvements hastened. NSPD-44 clearly designates
the State Department as the overall lead in stability and
peace operations, but both State and USAID need more
resources and backing to fulfill this charge. In support
of the lead mission, changes are being made to fully
use assets that are available to the State Department
and USAID, and more are proposed, including starting
a QDDR to better allocate the necessary funding and
manning to carry out these requirements. Coordinating
assets and procedures among the whole of the U.S.
Government is also part of this streamlining effort.
Finally, designating a directional body or person for
regional affairs could better balance resources and
efforts within the U.S. Government, and facilitate
coordination of actions with other governments,
NGOs, and IGOs. For practical reasons and to honor
longstanding democratic traditions, the best way
to attain U. S. national interests in Africa and other
regions of the world would be to consolidate economic
development and good governance as security and
stability issues under USAID.
SUMMARY
There is no limit to what a man can do or where he can
go if he doesn’t mind who gets the credit.
President Ronald W. Reagan382

This paper has traced the need for change in the U.S.
Government’s Africa policy and processes, described
how change is happening, and suggested what still
could be done. Rather than advocating radically new
policies, this paper concludes that the U.S. Government
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and the international community are starting down
a promising track with Africans to confront their
problems of political and economic malaise. This paper
has provided a survey of the current situation in Africa
in order to assist newly assigned personnel improve
their understanding of U.S. military and government
policy and doctrine that supports these efforts. Africa
is important to U.S. national interests because of its
cultural and economic ties, strategic central location,
environmental influence, humanitarian suffering, and
potential to spur violence and spread disease throughout
the world. Consequently, Africa is worthy of the greater
consideration that it has recently received. Africa’s
situation is economically and politically the worst in
the world, which adversely affects its population’s
health and education, its freedoms, and its chances for
stability and security—putting Africa further behind
and unable to participate in an ever more tightly
linked global economy. Its current economic growth
potential through its primary, secondary, and tertiary
economic activities is meager and requires external
assistance to realize the economic and political gains
needed for true stability and security. Such precarious
security and stability creates internal turmoil instead of
focusing positive energy toward problem resolution.
Since long-term security and stability rest on economic
development and proper governance, these latter two
elements must be addressed to meet the African and
international goals of peace and relative prosperity
for Africa. Otherwise African strife might disrupt
international security by causing African nations to
become sanctuaries for terrorists, or they might require
international military intervention to stop suffering.
Both governance and development must be tackled
together, and military forces can play an important
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part through coordinated stability operations and
peace building.
The U.S. military has a role to play in establishing
these benign conditions in Africa, and the founding of
USAFRICOM focuses and coordinates military efforts
to better do so. The traditional and current method
for military forces to promote stability and security is
through such direct intervention as peace operations
or, preferably by enabling host forces to play their role
in security as enhanced by U.S. theater engagement
activities like security cooperation, education, ACOTA,
HCA, and nation assistance. Although important,
these activities have a limited influence on the root
causes of instability, and therefore the roles of military
forces could be expanded. One way is to broaden
USAFRICOM’s role as leader and coordinator of U.S.
Government interagency efforts to improve economic
development and good governance. Although the U.S.
military has performed such a role throughout history,
this usually occurred after conflict in which the U.S.
military was involved and obligated to stabilize the
situation and to rebuild. Directly involving the military
in sustained development efforts or as the lead of a larger
effort to rebuild shattered or faltering states where the
United States had no previous role is a departure from
the norm. This departure may be difficult for Africans,
the U.S. public, and the international community to
tolerate. It is also counter to the dictates of NSPD44 and would require many changes to implement
at the scale envisioned here. The possible gain in
support of national interests from a more peaceful and
prosperous Africa does not justify the precedent and
organizational disruption that such a military lead
entails. Therefore the good that the military offers in
terms of countering violence and establishing order and
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enabling the more efficient and acceptable delivery of
economic and political development, should be firmly
directed by civilian control—be it unity of effort of U.S.
Government organizations or unified action with the
international community. To reinforce the civilian lead
in these efforts, the U.S. Government needs to continue
to emphasize civilian leadership through improved
manning, resources, processes, and greater integration
of military-civilian efforts. To stretch limited resources
and expertise, coordinating the efforts of individual
state donors could greatly amplify the good achieved
by each. Africa needs outside assistance to better its
situation. The United States and others will benefit by
offering this help.
Although this paper recommends subordinating the
military role to a civilian lead, the military’s mission to
attain security and stability remain important whenever
needed. Military forces should first focus on security
enforcement for which they are the specialists within
the U.S. Government and then address the necessary
tasks of stabilization and peace building, putting into
place the structure for proper governance and a viable
economy required by a functioning state. These steps
are required to lay the foundation for the efforts of
development agencies and local officials to carry out
their tasks of peace, state, and nation building. All of
these efforts, though, should be in support of local
initiatives and organizations when possible. Within
the U.S. Government, the military should complete
appropriate security and stability enforcement tasks
and judiciously support development and governance
tasks under the strong leadership of properly outfitted
professional civilian agencies during and after
crises, but especially before a crisis when such U.S.
Government support has the greatest impact. The
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military lacks the depth of knowledge in the crucial
disciplines that bring long-term security and stability
to a state or region. For this reason, the military should
defer to civilian professionals, and support them where
its suits U.S. interests and the needs of Africans. The
depressed state in Africa offers many opportunities to
help. This paper serves as a primer for those outside
the continent who wish to improve its long-term
security and stability through economic development
and better governance. It is time for Africans to interact
with the global community as equals, and the present
course puts them on that much delayed path.
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